Regional Transmission Organizations

Find papers and presentations on regional transmission organizations.

Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)

Ludwigson, Jon. “Oversight of RTO's.” In, 2008.Abstract
Ludwigson, Jon. Oversight of RTO's. Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group 53rd Plenary Session, December 11, 2008. 13 pages.
Tierney, Susan, and Edward Kahn (Analysis Group). “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the New York Independent System Operator: The Initial Years.” In, 2007.Abstract

Excerpt from the introduction:

The New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”) asked Analysis Group to conduct a study that would measure the costs and benefits associated with various aspects of the restructuring of the wholesale power market in New York. Our economic study focuses on certain key changes in operational performance of the power system during the initial years following the start-up of the NYISO. NYISO began operation at the end of 1999, as part of the larger process to restructure the electric industry in New York State. At the wholesale level, restructuring included both changes in the institutions responsible for grid operation and in the dispatch and market rules implemented by the NYISO, as well as major changes in the ownership of generation assets. These combined changes – especially the new market rules that paid generators market clearing prices – created strong profit incentives for improving operational performance of power plants. We look at the effect of these changes. There were many other changes in the industry as well, not all of which are amenable to quantitative assessment. To assess these larger changes in the economic environment, we examine broad measurable changes in wholesale power market performance, although we do not suggest that we have examined all factors comprehensively. Our spotlight focuses on the effects of changes in power plant dispatch rules and practices, and in incentives for improvement performance of generating units.

Chandley, John, and William W. Hogan. “A Path To Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference In Transmission Services.” In, 2006.Abstract

Excerpt from the Introduction:

 

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposals for Order 888 Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) reform arise from a continuing frustration with the Commission’s efforts to provide open access to transmission both for its own sake and to support competitive markets. The Commission has found it difficult to meet the basic requirement to avoid undue discrimination and preference in transmission services. This difficulty follows in part from the nature of the electricity grid. But more important, the transmission access procedures promulgated in Order 888 are not consistent with the requirements of reliable and efficient operation of the grid, nor do they support workable competitive markets. A better approach, more closely aligned with actual grid operations and compatible with competitive principles, is obviously needed. Unfortunately, the narrow focus in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) does not allow it to see the problems inherent in the current Order 888 framework that must be addressed to achieve the Commission’s goals.

After many prior attempts at broader reforms to meet its expansive goals for industry reforms, the Commission seeks now to narrow its scope to advancing limited changes to the OATT. The focus is on improving the consistency and transparency of the determination of available transfer capability (ATC) as the primary means to address undue discrimination. But if inconsistent ATC calculations and methods are not the underlying problem, then the proposed “solutions” will fail.

The emphasis of the past analyses has been on the defects of the OATT contract path and ATC framework. Although the Commission’s own analyses have recognized these defects, the Commission has not been able to address these matters without entangling itself in a larger debate about electricity market design and electricity restructuring. Given the impasse, it may be that the emphasis on ATC imposes too much on the Commission if it is to find a path to preventing undue discrimination and preference in transmission services. A different approach is needed.

Grid, National. “Transmission and Wind Energy: Capturing the Prevailing Winds for the Benefit of Customers.” In, 2006.Abstract

Executive Summary

The potential benefits of wind power as a clean, renewable, economic, domestically avail- able power source have captured the attention of energy policy leaders, consumers, and the electricity industry. The United States (US) has tremendous wind energy resources. California is viewed as one of the leaders in the modern US wind industry in terms of capacity installed; however, 16 other states have even greater wind potential. Only a small portion of that potential has been tapped. The US currently derives approximately 1% of its electricity from wind power, whereas parts of Europe use wind power to meet up to 25% or more of their electricity needs.

In 2005, wind power in the US grew rapidly and became more competitive as volatile natu- ral gas prices increased and crude oil prices reached record highs. Improved technology, federal tax credits and public policies that encourage utilities to use clean energy sources helped fuel the growth from coast to coast. Projections are that US wind capacity could reach 100 gigawatts (GW) by 2020, meeting 6% or more of national electricity needs.1

The objective of this paper is to examine the transmission policy issues around wind and renewable sources of generation. Reliability and commercial issues are reviewed, both in the US and abroad, and recommendations are provided for effective integration of wind sources into the US electric system. Key findings of this paper are:

■ Over-reliance in the US on any one fuel type results in reliability and economic consequences, highlighting the benefits of diversified energy resources.

■ Wind generation is becoming an economic power source, and has the further benefit of mitigating environmental climate change concerns.

■ In order to tap the vast potential of new generation sources such as wind power in the US, we must address the existing challenges in generator interconnection and trans- mission cost and planning policies.

■ The current US transmission system was not built to support competitive regional markets nor is it sufficient to integrate planned and potential new generation sources; additional transmission infrastructure will be required.

■ Operating techniques for intermittent generation resources, properly structured market rules, and effective transmission policies for regional planning, cost allocation, and cost recovery and incentives will help to facilitate wind power as well as other new sources of generation.

■ Transcos (for-profit independent transmission companies) focus on delivering low-cost reliable energy to consumers by facilitating robust electricity markets and providing transmission access to new generation sources including renewable energy. Because of their for-profit structure, a further advantage is that Transcos can be held firmly accountable by regulators for system performance and operating costs.

■ Robust transmission infrastructure policies in countries outside the US have helped them progress toward achieving their goals for renewable sources of energy while maintaining system reliability. The challenges to effective integration of wind power in the US are not insurmountable; they can be addressed with industry, public, and regulatory commitment.

■ Several countries, including Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK have had coordinated government efforts and policies to facilitate wind power, and these are proving very effective. Some areas of North America, such as Alberta and Texas, are also employing planning and cost allocation policies that are helpful to new generation sources.

Specific recommendations for changes needed to take advantage of US renewable resources to the benefit of electricity market users and customers are:

■ Employ greater use of available operational techniques, such as wind forecasting tools, for reliable operation of wind resources;

■ Properly structure market rules to address imbalance and capacity value in a manner that reliably and economically facilitates renewable generation sources;

■ Engage industry and stakeholders in long-term, robust, and comprehensive regional planning for transmission infrastructure, including infrastructure needed for new sources of generation;

■ Incorporate economic and customer cost metrics, in addition to reliability, into regional planning processes;

■ Implement workable cost-allocation and recovery mechanisms to recoup the costs of transmission infrastructure improvements;

■ Provide regulatory incentives for transmission infrastructure investment and independent ownership/operation of the nation’s transmission system.

ERCOT,The Market Guide: A Guide to How the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Facilitates the Competitive Power Market.” In, 2005.Abstract

Excerpt from the Introduction:


The ERCOT Independent System Operator (ISO) is the independent, not-for-profit organization responsible for the reliable transmission of electricity across Texas' interconnected 37,000-mile power grid. The ERCOT ISO has the responsibilities of ensuring reliable power grid operations in the ERCOT region jointly with the electrical energy industry organizations that operate within that region, ensuring open access to transmission ERCOT wide and distribution systems in areas permitting competition, ensuring the timely conveyance of market information to market participants, and ensuring accurate accounting of power produced and delivered.
To support these roles the ERCOT ISO focuses on the development, implementation, and ongoing management of reliable market and operating systems, transmission planning, retail mechanics supporting retail choice, accountable and reliable wholesale settlement and billing systems, and financial risk strategies. 4 ERCOT members serve about 85% of the electrical load in Texas, and have an overall generating capacity of approximately 75,000 Megawatts (MW). Because ERCOT is located entirely within Texas, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) is the principal regulatory authority. As of January 2005, ERCOT membership consists of 17 Industrial Consumers, 3 Retail/Commercial Consumers, 41 Electric Cooperatives, 16 Independent Generators, 19 Independent Power Marketers, 36 Independent Retail Electric Providers, 8 Investor Owned Utilities, and 19 Municipal Owned Utilities.