William W. Hogan

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William W. Hogan

Raymond Plank Professor of Global Energy Policy
Research Director

Professor Hogan is Research Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG), which is exploring the issues involved in the transition to a more competitive electricity market. Previously he has served as Chair of the Kennedy School Appointments Committee, Director of Graduate Studies for the Ph.D. Program in Public Policy and the Ph.D. Program in Political Economy and Government at the Kennedy School of Government, Chair of the Public Policy Program, Director of the Repsol YPF - Harvard Kennedy School Fellows Program for energy policy research, a member of the organizing committee for the Repsol YPF-Harvard Energy Policy Seminar, and as Director of the Energy and Environmental Policy Center. 

Professor Hogan has been actively engaged in the design and improvement of competitive electricity markets in many regions of the United States, as well as around the world, from England to Australia. His activities include designing the market structures and market rules by which regional transmission organizations, in various forms, coordinate bid-based markets for energy, ancillary services, and financial transmission rights.  This research is also part of the larger activities on the future of energy and energy policy research at Harvard University through the Environment and Natural Resources Policy Program, Environmental Economics Program, Harvard University Center for the Environment, and the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government.

William W. Hogan
Raymond Plank Professor of Global Energy Policy
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
p: 617-495-1317
Hogan, William W., Michael Caramanis, Elli Ntakou, and Aranya Chakrabortty. “Co-Optimization of Power and Reserves in Dynamic T&D Power Markets With Nondispatchable Renewable Generation and Distributed Energy Resources .” In, 2016. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Marginal-cost-based dynamic pricing of electric· ity services, including real power, reactive power, and reserves, may provide unprecedented efficiencies and system synergies that are pivotal to the sustainability of massive re· newable generation integrat ion. Extension of wholesale high-voltage power markets to allow distribution network connected prosumers to participate, albeit desirable, has stalled on high transaction costs and the lack of a tractable market clearing framework. This paper presents a distributed, massively parallel architecture that enables tractable transmission and distribution locational marginal price (T&DLMP) discovery along with optimal scheduling of centralized generation, decentralized conventional and flexible loads, and distributed energy resources (DERs). DERs include distributed generation; electric vehicle (EV) battery charging and storage; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) and c:ombined heat & power (CHP) microgenerators; computing; volt/var control devices; grid-friendly applianc:es; smart transformers; and more. The proposed iterative distributed architecture can discover T&DLMPs while capturing the full c:omplexity of each participating DER's intertemporal preferences and physical system dynamics.
Hogan, William W.Cross-product Manipulation in Electricity Markets, Microstructure Models and Asymmetric Information.” In, 2019. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Electricity market manipulation enforcement actions have moved from conventional analysis of generator market power in real-time physical markets to material allegations of sustained crossproduct price manipulation in forward financial markets. A major challenge is to develop and apply forward market analytical frameworks and models. This task is more difficult than for the real-time market. An adaptation of cross-product manipulation models from cash-settled financial markets provides an existence demonstration under uncertainty and asymmetric information. The implications of this analysis include strong empirical predictions about necessary randomized strategies that are not likely to be observed or sustainable in electricity markets. Absent these randomized strategies and other market imperfections, the means for achieving sustained forward market price manipulation remains unexplained.

Keywords: market manipulation; electricity markets; limits to arbitrage; asymmetric information

Hogan, William W.CarbonPricing inOrganizedWholesale Electricity Markets .” In, 2020. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Excerpt from the Introduction:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this technical conference. My comments here and during the conference are my own and do not represent the opinions of anyone else. The focus of my remarks will be on carbon pricing and the interactions with short-term electricity markets as found in the organized wholesale markets in the United States. I do not address the design and implementation questions focused on investments and resource adequacy that underpin capacity markets.

Panagiotis, Andrianesis, Michael C. Caramanis, and William W. Hogan. “Computation of Convex Hull Prices in Electricity Markets with Non-Convexities using Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition.” In, 2020. Publisher's VersionAbstract
—The presence of non-convexities in electricity markets has been an active research area for about two decades. The — inevitable under current marginal cost pricing — problem of guaranteeing that no truthful-bidding market participant incurs losses in the day-ahead (DA) market is addressed in current practice through make-whole payments a.k.a. uplift. Alternative pricing rules have been studied to deal with this problem. Among them, Convex Hull (CH) prices associated with minimum uplift have attracted significant attention. Several US Independent System Operators (ISOs) have considered CH prices but resorted to approximations, mainly because determining exact CH prices is computationally challenging, while providing little intuition about the price formation rational. In this paper, we describe CH price estimation problem by relying on DantzigWolfe decomposition and Column Generation. Moreover, the approach provides intuition on the underlying price formation rational. A test bed of stylized examples elucidate an exposition of the intuition in the CH price formation. In addition, a realistic ISO dataset is used to suggest scalability and validate the proof-of-concept.
Hogan, William W. Transmission Investment Beneficiaries and Cost Allocation: New Zealand Electricity Authority Proposal, 2020.Abstract

Excerpt from the introduction:

 

In a 2019 Issues Paper under its Transmission Pricing Review, the Electricity Authority of New Zealand set out a framework for efficient electricity system investment, cost allocation, and pricing. The basic design accords with beneficiary-pays principles. The challenges of transmission investment preclude pure market approaches and require consistency across both competitive and monopoly elements of the system. In comments on the Authority’s proposal, submissions of some parties include critiques or alternative recommendations that appeal to implicit assumptions inconsistent with the basic requirements of the technology and associated electricity market components. Although perfection is only possible under narrow conditions, the Authority’s framework provides a careful balance that adheres to first principles and can accommodate workable implementation.

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