Regulation and Policy

Find papers and presentations on all regulation and policy topics, or specifically on the topics of the EPAct; FERC rulings and reports; market "manipulation;" mergers, market power, and antitrust; national energy policy; regulation, governance, and judicial review; state and regional activities; and public power. 

 

Regulation and Policy

EPAct

The Clean Power Plan Endangers Electric Reliability: RTO and ISO Market Perspectives.” In, 2015.Abstract

Excerpt from the Executive Summary

Background

The Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP), published in June 2014, raises substantial operational challenges for regional transmission organizations (RTOs). In the CPP, EPA specifies emission reduction targets for 49 of the 50 states, based on EPA’s modeling that purportedly shows that each state can achieve the specified reduction targets through the use of four “building blocks.” States are to develop plans to meet the targets between 2020 and 2030, and are offered “flexibility” to use any combination of the four building blocks specified and/or other means (if approved by EPA) to achieve these targets. The State plans – required by June 30, 2016 (unless an extension is granted) - must specify how each state intends to meet the targets.

While there are many issues, questions and concerns with the ability of states and utilities to meet EPA’s emission reduction targets based on the use of EPA’s four building blocks (or through other means), building block 2, in particular, raises substantial issues for systems operators and RTO/ISO market operations because it involves changing the current methods of how electricity is dispatched throughout the nation’s bulk power systems.

Either FERC or the states have always overseen how security constrained economic dispatch is conducted to maintain reliability while cost-effectively serving customers. But, if EPA’s proposed rule becomes final, it, and not the system operators that federal and state regulators have entrusted, will make such critical decisions for our nation’s utility customers regardless of costs.

FERC Rulings and Reports

Staff White Paper on Guidance Principles for Clean Power Plan Modeling." Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, AD16-14-000, 2016."” In, 2016.Abstract

Executive summary

On August 3, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Clean Power Plan (CPP) under Clean Air Act 111(d). The CPP limits carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants by providing state specific goals for carbon dioxide emissions from affected electric generating units. As part of the CPP, EPA considered the potential impacts of the CPP on electric system reliability. Specifically, the CPP requires each state to demonstrate in its final state plan submittal that it has considered reliability issues in developing its plan. Separately, on August 3, 2015, EPA, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Commission agreed to coordinate certain activities to help ensure continued reliable electricity generation and transmission during the implementation of the CPP. 

While the CPP assigns no direct role to the Commission, it is possible that the Commission may be called upon, through the EPA-DOE-FERC Coordination Document or for other reasons, to address concerns about reliability as the CPP is implemented. In that case, the use of appropriate modeling tools and techniques will be helpful to the Commission in carrying out its responsibilities for reliability.

 This white paper identifies four guiding principles that may assist transmission planning entities, which may include regional transmission organizations (RTOs), independent system operators (ISOs), electric utilities, or other interested stakeholders, in conducting effective analysis of the CPP and associated state plans, federal plans or multi-state plans (compliance plans). The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the regional electric reliability organizations may also benefit from following these guiding principles as they perform CPP-related analyses. These guiding principles address four areas: (1) transparency and stakeholder engagement; (2) study methodology and interactions between studies; (3) study inputs, sensitivities and probabilistic analysis; and (4) tools and techniques.

Incorporating these guiding principles in the modeling of the CPP compliance plans is one way to promote a robust analysis of the reliability impacts of the CPP. The guiding principles discussed herein may form the basis for additional action by staff, such as industry outreach or technical conferences, or future action by the Commission.

The Clean Power Plan Endangers Electric Reliability: RTO and ISO Market Perspectives.” In, 2015.Abstract

Excerpt from the Executive Summary

Background

The Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP), published in June 2014, raises substantial operational challenges for regional transmission organizations (RTOs). In the CPP, EPA specifies emission reduction targets for 49 of the 50 states, based on EPA’s modeling that purportedly shows that each state can achieve the specified reduction targets through the use of four “building blocks.” States are to develop plans to meet the targets between 2020 and 2030, and are offered “flexibility” to use any combination of the four building blocks specified and/or other means (if approved by EPA) to achieve these targets. The State plans – required by June 30, 2016 (unless an extension is granted) - must specify how each state intends to meet the targets.

While there are many issues, questions and concerns with the ability of states and utilities to meet EPA’s emission reduction targets based on the use of EPA’s four building blocks (or through other means), building block 2, in particular, raises substantial issues for systems operators and RTO/ISO market operations because it involves changing the current methods of how electricity is dispatched throughout the nation’s bulk power systems.

Either FERC or the states have always overseen how security constrained economic dispatch is conducted to maintain reliability while cost-effectively serving customers. But, if EPA’s proposed rule becomes final, it, and not the system operators that federal and state regulators have entrusted, will make such critical decisions for our nation’s utility customers regardless of costs.

National Energy Policy

McCarthy, James, Alissa M. Dolan, Robert Meltz, Jane A. Leggett, and Jonathan L. Ramseur. “ EPA's Proposed Greenhouse Gas Regulations for Existing Power Plants: Frequently Asked Questions.” In, 2014.Abstract

SUMMARY

Taking action to address climate change by reducing U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is among President Obama’s major goals. At an international conference in Copenhagen in 2009, he committed the United States to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 17% by 2020, as compared to 2005 levels. At the time, 85 other nations also committed to reductions.

Since U.S. GHG emissions peaked in 2007, a variety of factors—some economic, some the effect of government policies at all levels—have brought the United States more than halfway to reaching the 2020 goal. Getting the rest of the way would likely depend, to some degree, on continued GHG emission reductions from electric power plants, which are the largest source of U.S. emissions.

In June 2013, the President released a Climate Action Plan that addressed this and other climate issues. At the same time, he directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to propose standards for “carbon pollution” (i.e., carbon dioxide, the principal GHG) from existing power plants by June 2014 and to finalize them in June 2015. Under the President’s timetable, by June 2016, states would be required to submit to EPA plans to implement the standards.

On June 2, 2014, EPA responded to the first of these directives by releasing the proposed standards.

The proposal relies on authority given EPA by Congress decades ago in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). This section has been little used—the last use was in 1996—and never interpreted by the courts, so a number of questions have arisen regarding the extent of EPA’s authority and the mechanisms of implementation. EPA tends to refer to the regulations as “guideline documents”—although that term is not used in the statute—perhaps to indicate that the section is intended to give primary authority to the states. The proposed guideline document would set interim (2020s averages) and final (2030) emission rate goals for each state based on four “building blocks”—broad categories that describe different reduction measures; in general, however, the policies to be adopted to reach these goals would be determined by the states, not EPA.

EPA faced a number of issues in developing the proposed regulations:

  • How large a reduction in emissions would it propose, and by when?

  • What year would it choose as the base against which to measure progress?

  • How flexible would it make the regulations? Would it adopt a “mass-based” limit on total emissions or a rate-based (e.g., pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt- hour of electricity) approach?

  • What role might allowance systems play in meeting the goals?

  • Will compliance be determined only by the actions of power companies (i.e., “inside the fence” actions) or will actions by energy consumers (“outside the fence”) be part of compliance strategies?

  • Would states and power companies that have already reduced GHG emissions receive credit for doing so? What about states and power generators with high levels of emissions, perhaps due to heavy reliance on coal-fired power? Would they be required to reduce emissions more than others, less than others, or the same?

• What role would there be for existing programs at the state and regional levels, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and for broader greenhouse gas reduction programs such as those implemented pursuant to California’s AB 32?

This report summarizes EPA’s proposal and answers many of these questions. In addition to discussing details of the proposed rule, the report addresses a number of questions regarding the reasons EPA is proposing this rule; EPA’s authority under Section 111 of the CAA; EPA’s previous experience using that authority; the steps the agency must take to finalize the proposed rule; and other background questions.

Group, The Brattle. “Brattle Group Policy Brief: EPA's Proposed Clean Power Plan: Implications for States and the Electric Industry."” In, 2014.Abstract

EXCERPT FROM THE INTORDUCTION:

On June 2, 2014 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced its proposed performance standards for reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing power plants under the Clean Air Act Section 111(d).1 The proposed rule requires each state to reduce its CO2 emissions rate from existing fossil fuel plants to meet state-specific standards (in pounds per MWh) starting in 2020, with a final rate for 2030 and beyond.2 The EPA estimates that the rule will achieve a 30% reduction in CO2 emissions from the U.S. electric power sector in 2030 relative to 2005 levels. Once the rule is finalized in 2015, states will have until June 2016 to submit initial state implementation plans, to be finalized by June 2017 for stand-alone plans, and by June 2018 for multi-state plans.

Agency, U.S. Environmental Protection. “Translation of the Clean Power Plan Emission Rate-Based CO2 Goals to Mass-Based Equivalents.” In, 2014.Abstract

EXCERPT FROM THE INTRODUCTION

This technical support document (TSD) describes two illustrative calculation-based approaches for translating the Clean Power Plan (CPP) emission rate-based goals to a mass-based equivalent. These approaches should be viewed as two potential ways in which implementing authorities may wish to translate the form of the goal to a mass-based equivalent. The first approach produces mass-based equivalents that apply to existing affected fossil fuel-fired sources only. In light of the fact that the CPP takes comment on the inclusion of new, fossil fuel- fired sources as a component of state plans, the second approach produces mass equivalents that are inclusive of emissions from existing affected and new fossil fuel-fired sources.

Stavins, Robert. “What are the Benefit and Costs of EPA's Proposed CO2 Regulation?” In, 2014. Publisher's VersionAbstract

EXCERPT:

On June 2nd, the Obama Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released its long-awaited proposed regulation to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing sources in the electricity-generating sector.  The regulatory (rule) proposal calls for cutting CO2 emissions from the power sector by 30 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.  This is potentially significant, because electricity generation is responsible for about 38 percent of U.S. CO2emissions (about 32 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions).

 

On June 18th, EPA published the proposed rule in the Federal Register, initiating a 120-day public comment period.  In my previous essay at this blog, I wrote about the fundamentals and the politics of this proposed rule (EPA’s Proposed Greenhouse Gas Regulation: Why are Conservatives Attacking its Market-Based Options?).  Today I take a look at the economics.

State and Regional Activities

Hogan, William W., and Susan L. Pope. “Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT.” In, 2017.Abstract

Executive Summary:

Electricity markets employ open access and non‐discrimination to foster competition, market entry, and innovation.    The physical characteristics of the electricity system require explicit consideration of key elements in electricity market design.  Pricing and settlement rules for the real‐time market must provide efficient incentives, both for short‐term operations and long‐run investment. The ERCOT energy‐only market design emphasizes the need to get the real‐time prices right.The recent innovation of the ERCOT Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC) addressed the fundamental problem of inadequate region‐wide scarcity pricing that has plagued other organized markets, which have exhibited inadequate incentives both for reliable operations and efficient investment.  

ERCOT employs an open wholesale electricity market as the basis for short‐term reliable electricity supply as well as for long‐term investments to maintain reliability in the future.  A review of energy price formation in ERCOT leads to two important conclusions: (i) while the ORDC is performing consistently within its design, scarcity price formation is being adversely influenced by factors not contemplated by the ORDC; (ii) other aspects of the ERCOT market design must be improved to better maintain private market response to energy prices as the driver of resource investment, maintenance expenditure and retirement decisions.   

The paper identifies three general issues that have affected ERCOT energy prices in recent years, and recommends policy and price formation improvements consistent with efficient market design. These recommendations cannot reverse the impact of broader economic trends, such as low natural gas prices, or national policies, such as subsidies for investments in renewable resources.  However, the stress of these forces has exposed areas where there is a need for adjustments to pricing rules and policies within ERCOT.