Litvinov, Eugene. “A Multi-Period Market Design for Markets with Intertemporal Constraints and Nonconvexity ” (2020).
Harrison, Jessica. “Price Formation and Multi-Period Dispatch ” (2020). harrison-price_formation-6.22.2020.pdf
Borenstein, Severin. “Dispatching Demand: A Critical Element of Future Electricity Systems?” 2020. hepg-dispatchingdemand-20201027.pdf
Centolella, Paul. “The Prices We Need: What pricing will be needed to realize an affordable clean energy future?” 2020. centolella_-_hepg_dispatching_demand_10_27_2020.pdf
E3,, and EPSA. Least Cost Carbon Reduction Policies in PJM, 2020. e3-least_cost_carbon_reduction_policies_in_pjm-final_10.28.2020.pdf
Tirez, Andreas. “Can We Have Capacity Mechanisms in Europe?” In, 2020. Tirez-Can we have capacity mechanisms in Europe-10.20.2020
Gramlich, Rob, and Frank Lacey. Who's the Buyer? Retail Electric Market Structure Reforms, 2020. Publisher's Version
Hogan, William W. Transmission Investment Beneficiaries and Cost Allocation: New Zealand Electricity Authority Proposal, 2020.Abstract

Excerpt from the introduction:


In a 2019 Issues Paper under its Transmission Pricing Review, the Electricity Authority of New Zealand set out a framework for efficient electricity system investment, cost allocation, and pricing. The basic design accords with beneficiary-pays principles. The challenges of transmission investment preclude pure market approaches and require consistency across both competitive and monopoly elements of the system. In comments on the Authority’s proposal, submissions of some parties include critiques or alternative recommendations that appeal to implicit assumptions inconsistent with the basic requirements of the technology and associated electricity market components. Although perfection is only possible under narrow conditions, the Authority’s framework provides a careful balance that adheres to first principles and can accommodate workable implementation.

Hogan, William W.Cross-product Manipulation in Electricity Markets, Microstructure Models and Asymmetric Information.” In, 2019. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Electricity market manipulation enforcement actions have moved from conventional analysis of generator market power in real-time physical markets to material allegations of sustained crossproduct price manipulation in forward financial markets. A major challenge is to develop and apply forward market analytical frameworks and models. This task is more difficult than for the real-time market. An adaptation of cross-product manipulation models from cash-settled financial markets provides an existence demonstration under uncertainty and asymmetric information. The implications of this analysis include strong empirical predictions about necessary randomized strategies that are not likely to be observed or sustainable in electricity markets. Absent these randomized strategies and other market imperfections, the means for achieving sustained forward market price manipulation remains unexplained.

Keywords: market manipulation; electricity markets; limits to arbitrage; asymmetric information

Hogan, William W. ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN: California ISO/PX “Fundamentally Flawed”.” In, 2019. Publisher's Version
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Wara, Michael. “Utility Liability: Pros and Cons of Socializing Costs .” In, 2019. wara.utility_liability-03.26.2019.pdf
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Massey, William. “CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS 2000-2001: .” In, 2019. massey_-california_energy_crisis_2000-2001-10.01.2019.pdf
Jones, Jay Smutney. “LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS .” In, 2019. smutney-california_energy_crisis-10.01.2019.pdf
ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN: California ISO/PX “Fundamentally Flawed” .” In, 2019. hogan-california_isopx_fundamentally_flawed-10.01.2019.pdf