Transmission

Find papers and presentations on all transmission topics, or specifically on the topics of financial transmission rights, merchant transmission, siting, and the smart grid.

 

Transmission

Baldick, Ross, Ashley Brown, Terry Winter, James Bushnell, and Susan Tierney. “A National Perspective on Allocating the Costs of New Transmission Investment: Practice and Principles.” In, 2007.Abstract

The United States electric system has served the nation well with decades of reliable and universal electricity service. However, there is an increasing and broad recognition that significant amounts of investment in the transmission system will be needed in the near and long term if the system is to continue to provide the kind of electricity service that Americans desire and on which the nation’s economy depends.

Attracting new investment in transmission in recent years has become more complicated than in the past because of the nation’s transition from a traditional era of utility regulation to a new era of national policy supporting “open access” to transmission. While the wholesale electricity market has changed fundamentally, the framework for enabling and encouraging investment that will better enable the grid to serve growing competitive markets has not yet fully emerged. One area still largely unresolved is how the costs incurred in transmission expansion will be allocated among users. While it is clear that many traditional cost-allocation approaches are no longer appropriate, new principles governing the allocation of cost responsibility for new transmission investment have yet to be fully articulated and implemented. It is the articulation of principles for that cost allocation that is the subject of this paper.

This White Paper focuses on the principles for determining the benefits of new transmission investments, and for allocating the costs efficiently and equitably among those who benefit from the enhancement. While for the most part Federal regulators have been attempting in recent years to accommodate the differences of opinion on these topics by adopting transmission cost-allocation proposals resulting from settlement discussions or negotiated agreements among stakeholders in specific geographic areas, this approach suffers from the lack of common, predictable principles supporting transmission investment for the interconnected grid that serves broad regions of the nation. While the acceptance of different regional approaches is understandable from a pragmatic point of view because such settlement processes often allow issues to be resolved with less contentiousness, that approach is inadequate to the task of creating a sustainable and viable environment for continuing attraction of capital into transmission projects. Indeed, it is unlikely that the widely divergent methods proposed and accepted for allocating transmission costs can produce a body of policies that together both meet the legal standard of just and reasonable results and also prove to be the foundation for sustainable investment for the long term, particularly when these allocations interact across 2 regional boundaries. Finding a principled basis for cost allocation that relies on more than lowest common denominators would certainly provide a more appropriate and sustainable basis for public policy.

Financial Transmission Rights

Transmission Risk Hedging Products: Solutions for the Market and Consequences for the TSOs.” In, 2006.Abstract

Executive Summary

In the framework of the EC Regulation 1228/2003, the goal of this background paper is to provide a description of the different market based solutions available for transmission risk hedging in congestion management. This paper presents three different transmission risk hedging products that can be offered to the market in the field of cross-border trade and congestion management. Due to various facts several price zones exist within the overall European electricity market where the demand of each zone is met in real time by the production of the respective zone and a zone specific market price is found (e.g. on the respective Power Exchange). This raises the question of how a market player wishing to buy electricity in a certain price zone and to sell it in another one can hedge the risk of a price difference emerging between those zones. This paper describes the three main kinds of transmission risk hedging products identified by ETSO: • Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs); • Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs); • Financial Contracts for Differences (CfDs); The paper also provides a first evaluation of the different solutions adopting a markets’ perspective. From a practical perspective, the implementation of forward PTRs only requires a minimum of market infrastructure and contractual arrangements. This is probably the reason for this product to be widely and successfully implemented on most European interconnections. However, Market Splitting or Coupling or co-ordinated implicit auctions would be the main prerequisite towards the implementation of marketbased FTRs and CfDs in Europe. Vice versa, in case Implicit Auctions (Market Splitting or Coupling) are introduced FTRs form a reasonable complement to those schemes for transmission hedging.

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Merchant Transmission

Joskow, Paul. “Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks.” In, 2006.Abstract

Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed. General issues associated with applying these principles in practice are identified. Examples of the actual application of incentive regulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for “unbundled” transmission and distribution networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric distribution and transmission networks is reviewed. Issues for future research are identified.

Joskow, Paul. “Patterns of Transmission Investment.” In, 2005. Publisher's VersionAbstract

This paper examines a number of issues associated with alternative analytical approaches for evaluating investments in electricity transmission infrastructure and alternative institutional arrangements to govern network operation, maintenance and investment. The economic and physical attributes of different types of transmission investments are identified and discussed. Alternative organizational and regulatory structures and their attributes are presented. The relationships between transmission investments driven by opportunities to reduce congestion and loss costs and transmission investment driven by traditional engineering reliability criteria are discussed. Reliability rules play a much more important role in transmission investment decisions today than do economic investment criteria as depicted in standard economic models of transmission networks. These models fail to capture key aspects of transmission operating and investment behavior that are heavily influenced by uncertainty, contingency criteria and associated engineering reliability rules. I illustrate how the wholesale market and transmission investment frameworks have addressed these issues in England and Wales (E&W) since 1990 and in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the U.S. since 2000. I argue that economic and reliability-based criteria for transmission investment are fundamentally interdependent. Ignoring these interdependencies will have adverse effects on the efficiency of investment in transmission infrastructure and undermine the success of electricity market liberalization.

Siting

Gavan, John C., and Rob Gramlich. John C. Gavan and Rob Gramlich - A New State-Federal Cooperation Agenda for Regional and Interregional Transmission, 2021. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Excerpt from the Introduction:

The experience of grid operators and planners in the United States and around the world has shown that both decarbonization and power system resilience will require large-scale regional and inter-regional trans- mission expansion. In the United States, transmission planning, cost recovery, and siting are all subject to both state and federal jurisdiction. To meet the challenge of expanding transmission to implement decarbonization, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) recently announced the Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission to focus on this issue.1 Resolving issues of siting and cost recovery for interstate electric transmission lines will encourage constructive state-federal cooperation. The task force and related regional and national coordination among the states, FERC, the Department of Energy (DOE), and federally regulated transmission providers will be critical to ensuring a resilient and clean power system.

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