## DC ENERGY

## QUANTITATIVE TRADING

## Electricity Warkets Outlook

**November 30, 2006** 

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OUANTITATIVE TRADING

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### Key Questions

- Is the current market adequate?
  - Adequate infrastructure investment
  - Adequate demand response
  - Promoting increased efficiency and alternative energy objectives
- If not, how can we get there?
- · When is it needed?

#### Today, the markets are at a fork in the road

#### Enables Market

#### ISO/RTO

- Reliability
- Planning
- Dispatch

Top Down Mandates: Command and Control Regulation

State/ **FERC Political Forces** 

- Percent DR
- Capacity payment
- Percent Revenues
- Cross subsidies
- Typically short-term fixes

#### **Fair Competition**

- Non-discriminatory, economic dispatch
- Transmission access

#### **Efficiency**

- Demand response
- Access to full energy price

#### Investment

- New generation
- Alternative/renewables
- Entrepreneurial development

#### **ISO Markets**

- Energy RT/DA
- FTR
- Capacity

#### **ICE/NYMEX Exchanges**

- Hubs
- Spread
- Options




- socialized dispatch) more rooust market? 2) Time horizon gaps
- 3) Product gaps

#### If you build it they will come . . . Or will they?







#### **Exchange Volume Trading Ratio**

(Financial Traded Volume/Actual Load)

Note: Assumes 90% ICE and 10% NYMEX market share in financial trading


Source: Dean & Company analysis, ICE, PJM, NYISO, MISO, ISO-NE, FERC EQR

Only considers CBOT trading volume on Futures products; half of the corn crop is traded 50x before delivery

<sup>·</sup> Volume from NYMEX and ICE Natural Gas. I rading; broker OTC market estimated at 10% of total volum

#### In fact, they should run to expanded markets

## Annualized Volatility by Products



Note: Power is based on the most liquid financial product: PJM Western Hub. Volatility represents buying and holding a PJM WH contract the day before, one month before or one year before settlement. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation in returns on the the hold period of 1 day (daily going to settlement) and one month for the monthly and annual contracts

Source: ICE and DCE analysis

Annualized Volatility = Daily Volatility x  $\sqrt{n}$  where n = trading days in one year (25)

Annualized Volatility = Monthly Volatility  $x \lor n$  where n = trading months in one year

# Exchanges are developed around markets with a high number of suppliers, high price volatility, and low product differentiation

## Commodity Comparison – U.S. View –

Category	Corn	Oil	Natural Gas	Electricity	Coal	Paper	Shipping (Truck Freight)
<ul> <li>Physical Suppliers</li> </ul>	41,000	7,730	7,730	1,997	1,190	561	112,642
<ul> <li>Physical Wholesale Buyers</li> </ul>	5,415	4,836 + 3,216 (non-bulk)	2,376	72 ÷ 7,325 (non-bulk)	313	13,395	16,504
Volume (Physical)	11.7B bushels (\$22B) (2005)	<b>7.6B barrels</b> (\$ <b>490B</b> ) (2005)	<b>22B MMBtu</b> ( <b>\$150B</b> ) (2005)	3.88 MWh (\$1528) (2005)	1.1B short tons ( <b>\$22B</b> ) (2005)	42MM short tons (\$32B) (2002)	1.5T ton-miles (\$164B) (2002)
<ul> <li>Price Volatility (Monthly)</li> </ul>	<b>23%</b> (2006)	<b>11%</b> (2005)	<b>29%</b> (2002)	<b>55%</b> (2006)	<b>6%</b> (2004)	<b>3%</b> (2006)	<b>15%–35%</b> (2003)
• Exchange?	Yes	Yes	Yes, hub and basis	Limited	No	No	No

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
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For example, PJM influenced the availability of monthly spread products through expanding the monthly FTR auctions to include the balance of planning period

## <u>New PJM Markets</u>


Expanding Options & Liquidity for Participants -





 Introduction of a "cleared" spread product through the PJM FTR Auction for future months has increased trading in bilateral/broker markets

#### The market has yet to converge on its most practical product



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
# However, the expanded markets are not typical exchanges — which is the hedgehog and which is the fox?

### Different Exchange Types



- Same product
- Same location(s)
- Same price

"One-to-one"



- Different products
- Different locations
- Different prices

"One-to-many" *or,* (many-to-many)

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What the market should provide to participants. Today is come close, but more is possible.

## Market Objectives

- Buy & Sell Power at Node(s)
- Hedged Price



LSE

- Muni
- · IOU
- •



Smooth earnings, certainty

- LT Power Price at Node
- Ability to Hedge



Generator

- Merchant
- Regulated
- •



Investment

- Uncapped Price at Node
  - To stimulate Demand Response
- Hedged Price
  - To limit Risk



**Consumers** 

- Large (with metering)
- And small eventually)
- •



- Efficiency
- Demand/response

### How to Get There?

#### PJM Reality

0. The Correct Exchange Design



• LMP, "many-to-many" exchange competence

1. Staffing & Budgets



 Budgets don't devote sufficient resources to markets.

 Whose money should be risked in developing new markets?

2. Governance



Governance focus on reliability

3. Incentives



Does it have the right incentives?

4. Regulation



Will it be regulated adequately for market products?

5. Innovation



 Quick roll-out, willingness to experiment.

### What is your wish list?

## Key Questions

- What market is:
  - Adequate?
  - Desired?
  - Ideal?

- When do we need this market?
- Who can/should provide it?