

Linking Ends and Means in Energy & Environmental Policy: Intended and Unintended Consequences

(And Assorted Observations that Reveal Why I'm in Boston Rather than D.C.)

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BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS DENVER LOS ANGELES MENLO PARK MONTREAL NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO WASHINGTON



Context: Our panel's (impossible) assignment

Linking Regulatory Means and Environmental Ends: Intended and Unintended Consequences

The turn towards a green energy revolution provides an uncommon opportunity to avoid a common mistake. "To forget one's purpose is the commonest form of stupidity." (Nietzsche) The source of a market failure, structure of an externality, or statement of a goal should affect the design of an intervention. A little reflection on the experience with the Fuel Use Act of 1978 should provide humility in mandating an answer (prohibiting use of natural gas) rather than targeting a market failure (the structure of natural gas price regulation). New opportunities abound for better policies. If GHG emission control is inexpensive, then a low safety valve could be appropriate as a risk reduction mechanism. If market penetration by a new technology produces large learning benefits, then initial subsidies should be both large and quickly disappearing. If there are multiple objectives, then there may be a need for multiple instruments. What is the right way to frame the connection between the diagnosis and prescription? How can we target diseases rather than symptoms? Faced with uncertainty, how can regulations, incentives, and subsidies best stimulate innovation? How can internalizing externalities balance competing agendas and diverse preferences?



Summing up –

- 1. Energy policy 101 a short history
- 2. Public policy 101 a conceptual framework, with respects paid to "The Public Interest"
- 3. Energy politics: "Everything's local"
- 4. Policy cycles: why it's hard to ever get it "right"
- 5. Final Observations



Duct tape glasses

 a useful lens for observing the development of policy P

1:

2:

"The tendency of bureaucracy is to find purpose in whatever it is doing." John Kenneth Galbraith

"What's good economics is bad "History does not move in a straight line, but by zigzags." Vladimir Lenin

Actually, a government

eternal life we'll ever see on this earth." Ronald Reagan



#1 – Energy policy 101 – A brief history



"National Energy Policy" – A quilt without a grand design

Shifting rationales for the role of government in energy policy:

- Energy policy as strategic investment
- Energy as a lever of social change
- Energy policy as protection against market power
- Policy to address external effects of energy production, use
- Energy policy as an enabler of markets
- Energy as means to protect our (economic, national) security

E.g., limitations on imports of sugar cane ethanol

More recently: competitiveness provisions in climate bills

E.g., "Atoms for Peace," TVA & BPA

More recently: EPACT §XVII Loan Guarantees, ARRA transmission funding

E.g., rural electrification in the New Deal.

More recently: EPACT Indian Energy Title V

E.g., Trust busting, utility regulation, price controls, SPR reaction to OPEC

More recently: CAFÉ, biofuels

E.g., Clean Air & Water Acts

More recently: bills to cap CO2 emissions

E.g., natural gas deregulation, IEA/OPEC, electric industry restructuring for competition

More recently: EISA market manipulation provisions

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"National Energy Policy": A quilt without a grand design

- Policy is not so much about making markets work better.
- "National Energy Policy" is the result of a very sticky web of discrete laws, regulations, programs, and so forth, with each new layer one folded on top of the others over time
- It's hard to find a unified theory to explain what underpins energy policy.



#2 – Public policy 101 – a brief conceptual framework



Typology of public policies (with thanks to T. Lowi, Wilson, Schlozmann & Tierney)

Policy type	Characteristics of the policy	Characteristics of the arena	Examples	Energy example
	"Anchor points on a continuum, rather the completely discrete categories"			



Defining "The Public Interest" – Theory and Practice

- The public's "common well-being" or "general welfare"
- A fundamental concern of the management of government
- Certain economic activities are "imbued with the public interest" – providing vital goods or services.
 - But the definition of what is vital may change over time with changing conditions
- "The public interest" is revealed through actions of agency decision makers as they apply the concept in decisions involving real actors and constellations of interests.
- There is little, if any, consensus on what exactly constitutes the public interest.

It is either wisdom or the collective convenience that causes policy makers to revert to this language in order to reach agreements on statutes



#3 –
Energy politics:
"Everything's local"



Domestic energy politics and politics: Highly geopolitical, highly local

 Regional disparities in natural resources, energy demand, environmental attitudes, labor attitudes, etc.

■ Differences often reflected in energy politics – e.g/

Producer states v. consumer states

Low-cost v. high-cost states

"Green states" v. "brown states"

Rural v. urban

Less often purely ideological in a sustained way (e.g., pro-market in a way that trumps other values)

WE'VE AGREED! IT'S TIME TO FINALLY ADD MORE POWER LINES TO BRING WIND POWER FROM THE PLAINS TO DISTANT CONSUMERS




BUT NOT TO

DISTRICT!




WE'VE AGREED! IT'S TIME TO PASS CLIMATE LEGISLATION SO THAT ENERGY PRICES REFLECT THE PRICE OF CARBON IN THEIR ENERGY BILLS

WE'VE AGREED! IT'S TIME TO STOP USING SO MUCH OIL IN SUVs WHEN IT MEANS WE'RE JUST SENDING MONEY TO COUNTRIES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM






Geopolitics of U.S. energy policy/politics: Two maps say a lot...



Regions that produce coal and use it for power have low prices, more carbon; regions relying heavily on natural gas have higher prices, less carbon.


Coal basins [dark color]

Price of Electricity [dark is higher price]






Washington support for "green energy"?





Washington support for "green energy" and carbon controls?





#4 –
Observations on policy development cycles:
Getting it "right" is hard



Policy ←⇒ Electric Industry Interactions: Example #2a

Electric Industry Restructuring – mid 90s

Economic conditions, e.g.

- CCGT technology
- low gas prices
- "merchant power model"
- average price > marginal cost
- customer choice pressure

Electric industry, e.g.

- Vertical integration
- Series of rate increases
- Aging generating fleet
- High emissions levels

Government policy, e.g.

- Transmission access
- Retail access with rate caps
- ISO markets
- Siting and zoning
- New source review, BACT





Policy ←⇒ Electric Industry Interactions: Example #2b

Electric Industry Restructuring - ~ 2006-2009

mid-decade Economic conditions, e.g.

- High natural gas prices
- Generator investment risk
- Market manipulation concerns
- Average price < marginal cost?
- Ele nic gadgets galore

Mid-decade:

Electric industry, e.g.

- Much divested generation
- ~10,000 MW of new capacity (NG)
- Gas sets prices ~85% of hours
- Post-rate-cap price increases
- Few retirements of old plants
- Little customer migration

Politics and policy, e.g.

- Long-term contracting & competitive Procurements, & Forward Cap Markets
- Need for national carbon control
- Re-regulation v. continuation of mkts
 - Energy investment as economic stimulus
 - Next chapter for transmission policy

2008-2009
Financial and
Economic Crisis



#5 – Some final observations



In theory, there are many interesting policy design tools

- Many ways to build into original policy design mechanisms to allow them to surgically address changing conditions over time – e.g.,
 - General "public interest" language
 - Sunset or "conditionality" clauses
 - Triggers (e.g., formulaic, discretionary)
 - Collars, caps, floors
 - Equivalent to "force majeure" clauses
 - Variance provisions



But in practice, policy making is never so clean – either at the beginning or over time

- Our ability to imagine the way(s) that the economy and society will respond is inherently, severely impaired
- That doesn't stop the need for policy makers to act in the face of problems or public (or clientele) demands
- Policy-making (a.k.a., sausage-making) is built on the need to reach agreements – which often requires silence on things that would disrupt the deal
 - Doing the deal is sometimes just as important as the specifics of the whole package
- There's rarely a constituency (i.e., or "consistency police") for assuring that a law has internal integrity



Example: Implications for policy on electric transmission?

Is it a strategic investment?

- To create jobs in this economic climate?
- To support development of renewable development for national needs?
- To modernize the system, making the grid "smarter" for the 21st Century?
- To guard against infiltration from cyber attacks, terrorists?

It is a tactical investment?

To enable further support for efficient power markets?

Is it to be inhibited so as to further other outcomes?

- To prevent equalization of inter-regional power prices?
- To ensure that demand-side measures have a chance to flourish on their own?

These objectives lead to very different outcomes for: siting authority, cost allocation, terms of access



So, return to the words of wisdom.....

Only in Wonderland

- "Begin at the beginning," the King said, cavely, "and go till you come to the end; then stop." Lewis Carroll
- "No government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. Government programs, once launched, never disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on this earth." Ronald Reagan.
- "History does not move in a straight line, but by zigzags." Vladimir Lenin

[.] Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 12, 1865.

Reagan, "A Time for Choosing," television broadcast, 27 October 1964.

Lenin (1870-1924), In Raymond Garthoff, How Russia Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine, 10, 1954.



Thank you -

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