**Regulated and Merchant Transmission Investment – Lessons From Australia** 

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### **Key Points of Presentation**

- Understanding the Australian context
- Merchant links in Australia
- Specific lessons from interaction of merchant links and regulated transmission
- Future direction





#### **The Australian Context**

- Scale and market power
- Gas and coal competition
- Market design





#### Australian Context – a big country!





Quality

Endorsed Company


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
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
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## **But a Small Population - Market Power in Energy a Big Issue**







Company

# Some Differences Between NE US and Australian Electricity Markets

- National 'Transco' a relatively small step
  - National Electricity Market Management Company has a number of ISO functions
  - Stand alone transmission companies only
  - Only 4 regulated NEM transmission owners
  - Medium sized company by international scale
- 'Energy only' market \$10,000/MWh price cap
- Approximate nodal pricing only
- Significant role of stability in setting constraints



Transmission and 'ISO' boundary less developed



## **Some Key Policy Issues (1)**

- State vs National Accountability Federation
- Improving competition in energy supply
- Market power of electricity generators particularly in small regions
- Price volatility:
  - the cost of risk
  - liquidity of interregional hedging markets
- Relatively weak transmission interconnection
- ISO (not for profit) performance drivers





# **Some Key Policy Issues (2)**

- Architecture for National Transmission Organisation
  - Pricing Framework
  - Planning
  - ISO vs Transco
  - Regulation and merchant investment
  - Access rights
  - Accountability for reliability
- Governance arrangements public policy vs participant interests
- Competitive neutrality public vs private ownership





# **Current Framework for Transmission Investment**

- Some distinction between reliability and congestion investment
- Public planning statements:
  - State based for reliability
  - National 'Statement of Opportunities' for interregional
- Investor can choose regulated or merchant path
- Merchant gets congestion residues between nodes
- Regulated links that pass regulatory test receive income from regulated transmission charges



Regulatory test is an open and thorough cost benefit framework

## Australian Merchant Links Unique

- No explicit benefit assessment for each project cf FERC approval in US
- Checks on market power relatively weak
  - Competition law only
  - 35% requirement
  - No open auction of rights
  - No explicit limits on the involvement of affiliates
  - No explicit limits on commercial arrangements with generators
- Can withhold capacity no 'use it or lose it'
- Hybrids a new experiment in Australia?






### Lessons from Australia (1)

- Directlink and QNI
- Highlighted the risks for merchant provider –
   partial control of integrated capacity very risky
- End game undefined (eg VIC SA merchant owner seeking to control all new capacity)





#### **QNI and Directlink – Network Context**







## **QNI and Directlink Compared**

#### QNI


- Regulated/overhead/AC
- Committed first
- 346 miles long
- Base capacity: 700MW
- Total cost \$AUD350 million
- \$AUD1,450/MW-mile
- Benefits \$AUD125 million pa

#### Directlink

- Merchant/underground/DC
- First in operation
- 40 miles long
- Max capacity: 180MW
- Total Cost: \$AUD135 million
- \$AUD18,600/MW-mile
- Local reliability benefits
   unsettled
- "FTR"revenue \$AUD4.9
  million (fiscal 2001)




#### **Queensland Pool Prices**








### **Ancillary Service Impacts**







### **End Game Problem – SA Experience**



## Lessons from Australia (2)

- Stakeholders will intervene with effect:
  - Governments: to ensure adequate reliability and acceptable price levels
  - Generators to protect market position
  - Gas suppliers to protect market growth
- Economies of scope & merchant framework:
  - Merchant proponent takes commercial position
  - Not necessarily consistent with overall system economics
  - Interaction between reliability and congestion complex





## Lessons from Australia (3)

- Transmission market poorly analysed:
  - <u>Transmission service needs poorly defined:</u> assets vs capability, sensible service performance indicators
  - <u>Common good characteristics</u>: net economic value added should be performance driver
  - <u>ISO constraint judgements:</u> substitute for transmission investment!
  - <u>Market failure mechanisms:</u> poorly analysed
  - Economies of scope: not fully appreciated by many



Elasticity of demand: ignored in price signals effort



## Future for Merchant Investment in Australia

- Uncertain in the short term
- Need holistic approach to transmission architecture first
- Architecture must suit policy context:
  - Eg energy market competition imperative
- Risky for network investors to pre-empt this
- US style links:
  - more chance of success
  - address market power issues better
- Desire to harness market forces is inevitable driver



