


# Reactive Power

## Is it real? Is it in the ether?



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December 2, 2004

Views expressed are not necessarily those of  
the Commission



# alternating current (AC) systems




- ⇒ produce and consume two kinds of power:
  - ⇒ real power (measured in volt-amperes or watts) and
  - ⇒ reactive power (measured in volt-amperes reactive or vars).
- ⇒ Real power accomplishes useful work (e.g., running motors and lighting lamps).
- ⇒ Reactive power supports the voltages that must be controlled for system reliability.
- ⇒ Reactive power may be supplied by
  - ⇒ switched shunt capacitors,
  - ⇒ static var compensators, STATCOM
  - ⇒ generators and synchronous condensers.
- ⇒ Reactive power does not travel over long distances at high line loadings due to significant losses on the wires.



# Physical characteristics and costs

- ⇒ reactive power support can be divided into:
  - ⇒ static
  - ⇒ dynamic.
- ⇒ Static reactive power e.g. from capacitors
  - ⇒ drops when the voltage level drops.
  - ⇒ Low costs
- ⇒ Dynamic reactive power e.g. from generators
  - ⇒ does not fall when voltage drops
  - ⇒ Higher costs.



# Characteristics of Voltage-Control Equipment

Equipment type	Speed of response	Voltage Support			Costs		
		Ability	Availability	Disruption	Capital (/kvar)	Operating	Opportunity
Generator	Fast	Excellent short-term capacity	Low	Low	Difficult to separate	High	Yes
Synchronous Condenser	Fast	Excellent short-term capacity	Low	Low	\$30-35	High	No
Capacitor	Slow	Poor, drops with $V^2$	High	High	\$8-10	Very low	No
Static VAR Compensator	Fast	Poor, drops with $V^2$	High	Low	\$45-50	Moderate.	No
STATCOM	Fast	Fair, drops with $V$	High	Low	\$50-55	Moderate	No
Distributed Generation	Fast	Fair, drops with $V$	Low	Low	Difficult to separate	High	Yes



# A generator's cost of producing reactive power




- ↳ depends on the thermal and stability limits of the generator
- ↳ When operating at certain limits, it can increase its production or consumption of reactive power only by reducing its production of real power.
- ↳ As a result, producing additional reactive power results in reduced revenues associated with reduced real-power production.
- ↳ include opportunity costs associated with forgone real power production.



# Generation Capability Curve





# Order 888 reactive power pricing


- ↔ Order No. 888 issued in April 1996.
- ↔ reactive supply from generation is an ancillary service
- ↔ two ways of supplying reactive power:
  - ↔ transmission costs are basic transmission service
  - ↔ generation unbundled from basic transmission service
- ↔ If market power, rates should be cost-based price caps
- ↔ Rates may be discounted
- ↔ Opinion 440: generation plant related to reactive power:
  - ↔ the generator and its exciter,
  - ↔ electric equipment that supports the generator-exciter
  - ↔ the remaining total production investment in the exciter.
  - ↔ allocation factor:  $Mvar^2 / MVA^2$
- ↔ under the control of the system operator.
- ↔ comparability



# Generation Interconnection Rule, Order 2003, for reactive power



- ⇒ generator should not be compensated for operating within its established power factor range.
- ⇒ the required range is 0.95 leading and 0.95 lagging
- ⇒ may establish a different power factor range.
- ⇒ must compensate for reactive power during an emergency.
- ⇒ if a transmission provider pays its own/affiliated generators for reactive power, it must also pay IPP.







# ISOs and RTOs compensation to generators for reactive power

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- ⇒ Most pay generators their allocated revenue requirement or other capacity payment.
- ⇒ some pay its lost opportunity costs
- ⇒ some impose penalties on generators for failing to provide reactive power




# International experience




- ↪ In England and Wales, a generator can accept a
  - ↪ default payment of  $\sim \$2.40/\text{Mvarh}$  leading or lagging, or
  - ↪ it may offer contracts with a minimum term of one year.
- ↪ In Australian ISO, generators and synchronous condensers.
  - ↪ receive an availability payment,
  - ↪ an enabling payment when dispatched and
  - ↪ opportunity costs from forgone sales of real power.
- ↪ In India, the regulator imposes a 4 paise/kvarh ( $\sim \$1/\text{Mvarh}$ ) price on reactive power when the  $1.03 < \text{voltage} < .97$
- ↪ In the Netherlands, generators are
  - ↪ contracted are paid for reactive power capability
  - ↪ no additional payment is made when it is supplied.
- ↪ In Sweden reactive power is supplied by generators on a mandatory basis, and there is no compensation.

# Literature review




- Schweppe et. al. (1988) method for hourly real-time real electricity prices
- Baughman and Siddiqi (1991) simultaneous pricing of real and reactive power
- Hogan (1993)
  - DC load models are not sufficient
  - the price of reactive power is not negligible .
- Kahn and Baldick (1994): Hogan's example is not realistic
  - Capacitors (plastic) are the answer
  - Reactive power is too cheap to meter
- PJM Reactive Services Working Group (2001) proposed
  - centralized planning with decentralized bidding for capacity projects
  - two-part tariffs to encourage capacity and performance
- Issues
  - Transactions costs: is it worth it?
  - can optimal power flow models be modified
  - efficient market with minimal intervention: market power

# important goals and questions



If you can name it  
you can sell it


- ⇒ encourage efficient and cost-effective investment in infrastructure
- ⇒ maintain the reliability of the system.
- ⇒ encourage efficient dispatch and use of the existing infrastructure
- ⇒ Can a market work? Yes with a good market design
- ⇒ Do we need a cost-benefit study? Yes, of course
- ⇒ Do market participants respond to price signals?  
Yes




# reactive power market design issues



- ⇒ whether or how such generators should be compensated for reactive power.
- ⇒ Hogan: its important
- ⇒ Kahn and Baldick: too cheap to meter
- ⇒ the need for differs by location.
- ⇒ Without payment for reactive power capability some older generators may retire
- ⇒ Comparable compensation for all generators
- ⇒ Compensation for static versus dynamic reactive power.



# Should generators be compensated?



- One view is that generators should not be compensated for reactive power within specified limits as a condition of interconnection
- they should bear the costs of maintaining this capability as well as the costs of producing reactive power from this minimum capability.
- Moreover, this requirement imposes little burden on generators because the costs of providing reactive power are typically small.
- The rationale offered by proponents is a version of 'good utility practice'

# ISO/RTO pricing options



## ⇒ capacity payment options

- ⇒ cost-based payment (Opinion 440)
- ⇒ Capacity market payment (ICAP)
- ⇒ Co-optimized auction (LICAP plus)
- ⇒ Pay nothing (good utility practice)

## ⇒ spot pricing options

- ⇒ Pay nothing (good utility practice)
- ⇒ Unit-specific opportunity costs (D-curve)
- ⇒ Market clearing price auctions (marginal value)
- ⇒ Prices announced in advance (simple approach)



# reactive power market power



- ↪ markets may have market power
- ↪ cost-of-service mitigation can blunt and distort incentives
- ↪ AMP mitigation
- ↪ market power may be a smaller problem if entry and exit may become much easier.
- ↪ equipment that now comes in smaller mobile (e.g., truck mounted) increments
- ↪ Convert old generators



# Spot markets for reactive power

- ⇒ Integration of reactive power in spot markets has the potential to reduce the total costs of meeting load substantially.
- ⇒ Software development is needed
- ⇒ Simulation and experimentation are needed to understand the effects of alternative auction market designs before such a spot market is implemented.



# Co-optimized P/Q markets

Node A  
 Generator 1000 MW  
 500 Mvar  
 bid = \$10/MW

AB  
 bid = \$0/MW  
 capacity: 600 MVA

Node B  
 demand: 1000 MW  
 500 Mvar  
 Generator : 500 MW  
 150 Mvar  
 bid = \$80/MW




bus	$V_B$	cost	Gen A				Gen B			
			P	PLMP	Q	QLMP	P	PLMP	Q	QLMP
Gen B < 150 Mvar	.91	\$20,647	905	\$10	424	\$0	145	\$80	150	\$33
Gen B < 400 Mvar	.94	\$15,196	983	\$10	182	\$0	67	\$80	390 <sub>18</sub>	?

# Computational considerations

"perennial gale of creative destruction" Schumpeter

- ⇒ 1996: LMP in New Zealand
  - ⇒ 300 nodes; transmission constraints are manual
- ⇒ 1990s: linear programs improved by  $10^6$ 
  - ⇒  $10^3$  in hardware;  $10^3$  in software
- ⇒ 2000s: mixed integer design improved by  $10^2$ 
  - ⇒ Hardware: parallel processors and 64 bit FP
  - ⇒ Software: better performance
- ⇒ New modeling capabilities in MIP
- ⇒ 2006: 30000 nodes
  - ⇒  $10^4$  transmission constraints;  $10^3$  n-part generator bids
- ⇒ 2010: co-optimized reactive and transmission





“Every great movement must experience three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption” John Stuart Mill

Is ether returning as dark matter?

