

From Rate Caps to Market Prices: The Path to Retail Competition

**Presentation to the
Harvard Electricity Policy Group**

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**February 1, 2001
San Diego, CA**

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Differences in Retail Restructuring Between CA and MA

- Utility Supply Procurements**
- Retail Rate Structures**
- Default Service**

Distribution Company Supply Procurements in CA and MA

California

- ◆ Long-term contracts not allowed or discouraged
- ◆ Spot market purchases required or encouraged
- ◆ Distribution companies may keep overcollections but may not collect excess costs

Massachusetts

- ◆ Long-term contracts allowed
- ◆ Spot market purchases allowed
- ◆ Distribution companies must refund overcollections but can recover excess costs


Hedging in Three Wholesale Electricity Markets

Summer 2000


| | Percentage of Contracts, Own Generation | Percentage of Spot Market |
|-------------|--|------------------------------|
| CAISO | 40-50 | 50-60 |
| New England | 80 | 20 |
| PJM | 85-90 | 15-10 |

Source: Anjali Sheffrin, Presentation: CMR-Global Market Power Mitigation, October 4, 2000

CA Retail Prices vs. Wholesale Generation Costs




MA Retail Standard Offer Prices vs. Wholesale Generation Costs



MA Retail Default Service Prices vs. Wholesale Generation

WMECo Comparison of Fixed and Variable Retail Prices




Source: WMECo 2000 Reconciliation Filing & DOER

Problems Remain for Retail Restructuring in MA

- Retail competition is shrinking
- Use of spot market may be increasing
- Retail demand response is almost non-existent

Massachusetts Customers by Type of Generation Service


Total Monthly kWh Sales



Source: DOER Customer Migration Numbers

Wholesale Prices Do Not Effect Retail Demand

Wholesale Prices Climbed to \$6000/MWh on May 8, 2000 but Demand Did Not Respond to the Price Signal




(Hour Normalized Demand and Energy Clearing Price)

Source: ISO-NE

Energy Efficiency and Load Management Reduce Clearing Prices

Wholesale Prices would have been considerably higher on June 7, 1999 without the benefits of Load Management and Energy Efficiency



Source: ISO-NE

The Path to Retail Competition

- Build a competitive wholesale market as soon as possible
- Encourage utility supply procurements that stabilize wholesale prices
- Shift regulated retail rates to market pricing, slowly but surely
- Provide new incentives for load management and energy efficiency