

# The distributional impacts of residential electricity rate design

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# What we will talk about today:

## 1. Do fixed charges harm low income customers?

- *Distributional outcomes are a design choice, not a fact of efficient charges*

## 2. What is the cost of inaction?

- *Efficient tariffs create substantial consumer surplus benefits*
- *Rooftop solar may dramatically increase rates for low-income customers, making flat tariffs worse than efficient tariffs*

**Do fixed charges harm low income customers?**

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# To evaluate alternative tariffs we use metering data from Chicago, USA



100,170 anonymized households



Consumption January-December 2016




30-minute smart meter readings




Housing type




Heating type



Geographic data: 9-digit zip code



**We developed and analyzed five innovative rate designs – all rates were designed to ensure ComEd recovered all network and policy costs**





# **We map consumption data to Census data on income and other key socioeconomic variables**

- Geographically distinguished at Census Block Group (CBG) level
- Distribution of household incomes and other socioeconomic variables by CBG
  - Nine discrete income classes
  - Other socioeconomic variables on race, employment, education, etc.



# Increasing fixed charges in a uniform fashion increases expenditures for low-income customers, but moving to real-time prices does not



# **Progressive fixed charges can mitigate undesirable distributional outcomes while maintain consumer surplus benefits of efficient rates**

- **Objective: Maintain overall system savings while avoiding undesired social effects**
- Idea: Differentiating fixed charges according to certain customer criteria
- Two proposals for fixed charge design:
  1. Customer demand characteristics
  2. Observed customer income


# Many customer demand characteristics correlate more strongly with income than does total consumption

Customer demand characteristics by income, indexed to low-income customers

Income (\$1,000 USD)	Average Monthly Consumption	Annual Peak Demand	Peak-To-Off-Peak Ratio	May Peak Demand	June Peak Demand	July Peak Demand	August Peak Demand	Consumption: 5:30PM-6:00PM	Consumption: 6:00PM-6:30PM	Consumption: 6:30PM-7:00PM
<\$15	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
\$15 – \$25	1.07	1.03	0.95	1.05	1.06	1.05	1.05	1.08	1.08	1.08
\$25 – \$35	1.10	1.06	0.95	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.12	1.12	1.11
\$35 – \$50	1.12	1.09	0.95	1.12	1.13	1.13	1.12	1.15	1.15	1.15
\$50 – \$75	1.14	1.13	0.97	1.17	1.17	1.17	1.16	1.18	1.18	1.18
\$75 – \$100	1.18	1.17	0.97	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.21	1.23	1.23	1.23
\$100 – \$125	1.20	1.19	0.97	1.25	1.26	1.25	1.25	1.26	1.26	1.26
\$125 – \$150	1.21	1.21	0.98	1.27	1.28	1.27	1.27	1.28	1.28	1.27
>\$150	1.25	1.29	1.02	1.36	1.35	1.34	1.33	1.32	1.33	1.32


# Fixed charges based on customer demand characteristics that correlate strongly with income can be far more progressive than uniform fixed charges

- ✓ Feasible with existing and available data
- ⚠ Risk of Type 1 and Type 2 errors
- ⚠ Inefficient incentives when changed frequently




**With smart meter data and available customer demographic data, it is possible to target rebates or incentives to those who need them most**

- ✓ No Type 1 and Type 2 errors
- ✓ Granular control over distributional effects
- ! Additional sensitive customer data required



# Protections provided to low-income customers can be designed to have minimal bill impacts on other customers

Progressive hedges protect low-income customers at minimal cost to non-low-income customers




**What is the cost of inaction?**

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
# Efficient rate designs increase consumer surplus for nearly all customer segments at very low levels of price elasticity

Changes in consumer surplus relative to the flat (default) tariff for customers with <\$15,000 per year in income




# Solar PV adopters tend to be wealthy – Median solar adopters are >50% wealthier than the average household, and more than 80% of solar adopters are in the top three income quintiles

Income trends of PV adopters, 2000 - 2016




**Low-income solar installations have grown since 2008, but are the same as in the year 2000 – The demographics are changing over time... sort of...**

**Solar installations in the top three income quintiles (“top 60%”) versus the bottom two income quintiles (“bottom 40%”), in 2000, 2008, and 2016**




# Under tariffs with volumetric residual cost recovery, distributed solar is likely to lower bills for high income customers at the expense of low income customers

Changes in expenditures by income quintile  
Flat, volumetric tariff




# Holding fixed charges constant, the volumetric charge for residual cost recovery roughly triples as solar PV penetration increases

Changes in volumetric charges for residual cost recovery  
Flat, volumetric tariff




# Within and across income classes, solar adopters benefit at the expense of non-adopters

Changes in annual expenditures by income: Adopters vs. Non-Adopters  
Flat, volumetric tariff




# Efficient tariffs eliminate cost shifts, enabling energy cost savings and average savings across income quintiles

Changes in expenditures by income quintile  
Real-time price tariff with fixed residual cost recovery




# Efficient tariffs eliminate cost shifts, enabling energy cost savings and average savings across income quintiles

Changes in annual expenditures by income: Adopters vs. Non-Adopters  
Real-time price tariff with fixed residual cost recovery



# Low-income expenditures may be lower under a fixed-charge tariff at moderate rooftop solar penetrations – This observation contradicts common rate design logic

Changes in expenditures by income quintile  
Real-time price tariff with fixed residual cost recovery vs. Flat tariff






# Thank you

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# We create and evaluate five innovative tariffs designs – All tariffs are designed to recover all costs for the utility




# **The challenge of inefficient rates**


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# Plenty of goods are unevenly distributed in society – Why should we care about DER ownership?


Boat ownership rate by household income in the U.S., 2013




**Under inefficient tariffs, DER adoption reduces revenues more than it reduces system costs – as revenue for existing network assets and policies fall, the utility has to recover these “residual” costs of by raising rates**



**The quantity of residual costs is highly uncertain – If residual costs are high, the potential for cost shifting is also high**



**Efficient prices reflect the marginal cost of using networks – If networks are constrained, network revenues rise**



# **The distributional impacts of PV adoption**

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# **Sensitivities bound our estimates of distributional impacts – I model a low- and high-impact case, providing a broad view of the potential distributional impacts of PV adoption**

**A**

**Networks have significant slack, and all networks costs are “residual”**

**B**


**Networks are constrained, and all distribution costs are marginal**

# Sensitivities bound our estimates of distributional impacts – I model a low- and high-impact case, providing a broad view of the potential distributional impacts of PV adoption

A

Networks have significant slack, and all networks costs are “residual”

Peak loading on the circuit is only 15% of the circuit’s rated capacity. Peak demand reduction has no immediate network cost reduction value




**Sensitivities bound our estimates of distributional impacts – I model a low- and high-impact case, providing a broad view of the potential distributional impacts of PV adoption**

**B**



**Networks are constrained, and all distribution costs are marginal**

Peak loading is 95% of rated capacity & growing. Peak demand reductions could eliminate or delay the need to invest in upgrading this circuit



# Our hypothesis is that the majority of distribution feeders are unconstrained – evidence from CA indicates that solar PV may not have ubiquitous distribution value

Capacity benefit of distributed solar PV in PG&E's network



# **The distributional impacts of PV adoption: Zero marginal network cost cases**

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**ComEd’s default tariff is volumetric, and time- and location-invariant – such “flat” tariffs are common across the U.S.**

*ComEd Default Tariff* =  $p_{i,t,\phi}^e + p_{i,t,\phi}^{ccc} + p_{i,t,\phi}^r + p_{i,t,\phi}^{cp} + F_{i,\phi}^r$

Energy  
~\$0.05/kWh

Residual costs  
~0.05/kWh

Residual costs  
~\$10/month

\$0/kWh

\$0/kWh

The diagram shows the ComEd Default Tariff equation with several annotations. Blue arrows point from descriptive text to terms in the equation: 'Energy ~\$0.05/kWh' points to  $p_{i,t,\phi}^e$ , 'Residual costs ~0.05/kWh' points to  $p_{i,t,\phi}^r$ , and 'Residual costs ~\$10/month' points to  $F_{i,\phi}^r$ . Red arrows point from '\$0/kWh' labels to the terms  $p_{i,t,\phi}^{ccc}$  and  $p_{i,t,\phi}^{cp}$ , which are also crossed out with red diagonal lines.

I construct an “efficient” tariff with a real-time price, a “coincident capacity charge” for “marginal” generation capacity costs, and a fixed charge for residual cost recovery

$$RTP - CCC = p_{i,t,\phi}^e + p_{i,t,\phi}^{ccc} + \cancel{p_{i,t,\phi}^r} + \cancel{p_{i,t,\phi}^{cp}} + F_{i,\phi}^r$$

\$0/kWh
\$0/kWh

Energy  
~\$0.03/kWh

“Marginal”  
generation  
capacity costs  
~\$1/kW

Residual costs  
CCC: ~\$39/month


**Note: I model the possibility of a non-zero marginal network charges in the next section**

# **The distributional impacts of PV adoption: Marginal network cost cases**

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The potential “value of D” is smaller than the average residual cost shift – Flat tariffs are likely creating a cost shift with today’s rates

Value of distribution network deferral and distribution network loss reduction versus the volumetric tariff residual cost shift




I construct an “efficient” tariff with a real-time price, a “coincident capacity charge” for “marginal” generation capacity costs, a “coincident peak” charge for “marginal” network costs, and a fixed charge for residual cost recovery


\$0/kWh

$$RTP - CCC - CP = p_{i,t,\phi}^e + p_{i,t,\phi}^{ccc} + \cancel{p_{i,t,\phi}^r} + p_{i,t,\phi}^{cp} + F_{i,\phi}^r$$


Energy  
~\$0.03/kWh




“Marginal”  
generation  
capacity costs  
~\$1/kW



“Marginal”  
network costs  
~\$0 - 0.55/kW




Residual costs  
~\$15/month




# At low penetrations, rooftop PV may decrease future network costs, but at high penetrations, rooftop PV increases network costs

Estimation of network capacity value of distributed PV




# Similarly, rooftop solar likely reduces marginal losses at low penetrations, but drives losses at high penetrations

Estimation of distribution loss avoidance value of distributed PV




# Efficient tariffs eliminate cost shifts, enabling energy cost savings and average savings across income quintiles

Changes in expenditures by income quintile  
Real-time price tariff, fixed residual cost recovery, and marginal network costs




# Efficient tariffs eliminate cost shifts, enabling energy cost savings and average savings across income quintiles

Changes in annual expenditures by income: Adopters vs. Non-Adopters  
Real-time price tariff, fixed residual cost recovery, and marginal network costs



# Low-income expenditures are on average lower under an efficient tariff with marginal network costs – efficiency and equity need not be in conflict

Changes in expenditures by income quintile  
Real-time price tariff, fixed residual cost recovery, marginal network cost vs. Flat tariff



Tariff: ■ Default (Flat) ■ RTP-CCC-CP      Income Quintile: ■ Q1 ■ Q2 ■ Q3 ■ Q4 ■ Q5