## Markets and Regulation in Infrastructure

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"If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there."

William Hogan

### **Three Caveats!**

- 1. Confusing Means and Ends
- 2. Confusing Competition and Deregulation
- 3. Institutions Matter

## 1. Confusing Means and Ends

#### Means

- Competition
- Regulation

#### Ends

- Efficiency and productivity
- Service quality
- Responsiveness to consumers
- Meeting defined social expectations

## 2. Confusing Competition with Deregulation

- Competition
  - State of a market
- Deregulation
  - Public policy position

## 3. Institutions Matter/Not All Economic Theory

#### **Jurisdictional Boundaries**

- Wholesale/retail
- Scope of authority

#### Relevant Regulatory Missions

- Licensing and siting
- Economics
- Fulfilling social expectations (e.g., environment, low income)

## **Economic Efficiency vs. Social Considerations**

- Are results of market acceptable to society?
- Key social considerations
  - Universal service (e.g., rural, poor)
  - Environment
  - Economic development
  - Resource preferences

Privatization and competition do not change social expectations!

## **Regulatory and Market Environments**

Tensions between Certainty and Flexibility

### **Market Environment**

- Rules Certainty/Uncertainty
- Market Uncertainties/Certainties
  - Micro
  - Macro
  - Controllable
  - Uncontrollable

## Regulatory Environment

## Tensions between Certainty and Flexibility

#### **Demands**

- Investors and consumers look for certainty and predictability in the regulatory process
- Flexibility, however, is often required to adapt to changing circumstances

#### Responses

- Regulation by contract
  - Bilateral change only
  - Role for regulator?
- Discretionary regulation
  - Unilateral change with process protections

## **Regulatory Environment**

Rule based	Contract based	
Discretion defined by law	Discretion defined by license	
Regulator can change rules	No unilateral change	
Procedural safeguards	Contractual safeguards	
Ability to adjust to changed circumstances	Pressure to be correct from the start	
Short-term uncertainty	Certainty in short term	
Politically stable	Political stability dependent on concessionaire's flexibility	

## Can Markets and Regulation Co-Exist? Spectrum of Regulatory Approaches

#### Market designs and institutional structures matter!

- Heavy
  - Pro-active regulation
  - Pervasive regulation (e.g., pricing)
  - Prescriptive
- Medium
  - Reactive regulation (e.g., anti-trust)
  - Bottlenecks only
  - Use of norms and indices
- Light
  - Self-regulation (including litigation)
  - Monitoring only (i.e., how much transparency)

Deregulation

### **Extent of Reliance on Markets**

- Ideological leaps of faith (e.g., deregulation means functional markets)
- Contestability? Actual and contested?
- Treatment of externalities/social outcomes
- Using market mechanisms or pure markets
- Good market design is essential

#### **Market Environment**

#### **Demands**

 Private investors and consumers will want to know to what degree market forces will be relied upon

#### **Responses: Developing the standards**

- Mere possibility of competition is sufficient?
- Contestable or contested?
- Is competition sustainable and viable?
- Policy response to monopoly breakdown or leakage?
- If market forces will be relied upon, all interested parties certainly want to know what the rules of the marketplace will be
  - How will markets operate long term?
  - How will markets function short term?
  - What institutions will be put in place?
  - Market power: horizontal? Vertical?
  - Antitrust
  - Vertical integration
  - How much price volatility is tolerable upside and downside?
  - · How can we be assured that investment will be made?

## Regulation of Markets Promoting and Maintaining Competition

#### **Behavioral Fixes**

- Easier to enact
- Difficult to enforce (e.g., brokerage research)
- Management priorities (e.g., talent and effort follow dollars)

#### Structural Fixes

- Difficult to enact
- Easier to enforce
- Clearer management focus

## When Are Essential Service Providers Market Participants?

#### **Examples**

Electric transmission owners, local exchange carriers, distribution companies

#### **Alternatives**

- How effective?
- How expensive?
- How complicated to administer market mechanisms (e.g., number portability vs. transmission expansion)

## **Regulation of Markets**Diversification and Convergence

#### Effects of diversification

- Enhanced risks/rewards
- Who benefits? Who loses?
- Management focus and resources
- Impact on competition

#### **Effects of convergence**

- Enhanced risks/rewards
- Who benefits? Who loses?
- Management focus and resources
- Impact on competition

#### **Demands**

- Provide investor with reasonable opportunity to recover capital
- Provide investors with reasonable opportunity to earn profits commensurate with risks taken
- Incentives to perform
- Replicate results of market

#### Responses

- If there is competition
  - · Prices are market determined
- If a monopoly
  - Cost or service (rate-of-return pricing)
  - Price cap?
  - Revenue cap?

#### Rate-of-Return vs. Price Cap

- Rate-of-Return Formula
   (capital investment depreciation)ROR + expenses
- Price Cap Formula (cost basis)RPI (-x?)
- Revenue requirement (cost basis)RPI (-x?) capped by revenue adequacy

Rate of return	Price cap	Revenue cap
Fact intensive	Theory intensive	Theory intensive
Regulatory review of management	Clear boundary between management and regulation	Clear boundary between management and regulation
Direct review of profits	Indirect review of profits	Indirect review of profits
Factors may/may not be internalized	Internalization of many factors (but not all)	Internalization of many factors (but not all)
Rates may/may not have specific terms in time	Rates may/may not have specific terms in time	Rates may/may not have specific terms in time
Throughput based (volume)	Throughput based (volume)	Focus on revenue requirement (non-volumetric)

## Alternative Pricing Foundations A. Historic Costs

#### **Advantages**

- Tested reasonableness
- Ascertainable/documented
- Established applicability

#### **Disadvantages**

- Prudence filter
- Little inherent incentive for efficiency gains
- Embeds inefficiencies/waste
- Accounting controversies
- Original costs depreciation? Replacement cost? Other?

## Alternative Pricing Foundations B. Comparative Costs

#### **Advantages**

- Benchmarks good performance (partially ascertainable)
- Promotes competition

#### **Disadvantages**

- Uncertain applicability
- Uncertain accuracy
- Could embed inefficiencies

# **Pricing Monopoly Services**Alternative Pricing Foundation C. Theoretical Costs

#### **Advantages**

- Sets performance objectives
- Avoids accounting controversies

#### **Disadvantages**

- Untested/potential for being unrealistic
- Potential for uncertainty

## Boundaries between Regulation and Management/Risk Allocation

#### **Demand**

- Investors need to be able to manage their own assets and affairs if they are to be held accountable
- Regulators must be able to allocate risks in accordance with controllability

#### Responses

- Reasonableness of costs?
- Prudence?
- Effectiveness of incentives?
- Ex post or ex ante regulation?
- What is internalized (socialized)?
- What is externalized (privatized)?

## **Social Expectations and Standards**

#### **Demands**

- Economic efficiency
- Social expectations (e.g., universal service, environmental, low-income subsidies, quality of service)
- Consumer expectations (e.g., timely payment of bills, reasonable access, protection from theft of service)

#### Responses

- Articulate expectations in license or law (ex ante)
- Internalize into privatization

#### **Institutions Matter**

- Jurisdiction symmetrical with markets? (e.g., siting electric transmission)
- Sensitivity to local interest? (e.g., resource selections)
- Filling regulatory vacuums? (e.g., PUHCA)
- Sensitivity to consumers?
- Sensitivity to industry needs?
- Sensitivity to larger market needs?

#### **Appellate processes**

- Protracted disputes?
- Curbs on regulatory abuse?

## **Institutions Matter: Who Sets Policy?**

- What is policy?
- What is regulatory?
- Role of policymakers/lawmakers
- Role of regulators/role of policymakers