Harvard Electricity Policy Group

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Borenstein, Severin, and James Bushnell. “Do Two Electricity Pricing Wrongs Make a Right? Cost Recovery, Externalities, and Efficiency Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell September 2018,” 2018.

borenstein_do_two_electricity_pricing_wrongs_make_a_right.pdf

Brown, Ashley. “Regulatory Treatment of Risk: Management and Allocation,” 2018.Abstract

brasiliariskalloc061818.pdf

Regulatory Conference

BRASILIA, DF, BRAZIL

June 18, 2018

Ashley C. Brown

Executive Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group

Harvard Kennedy School

Harvard University

Brown, Ashley. “Distributed Solar Generation: Value & Pricing, A North American Perspective.” DISTRIBUTED SOLAR GENERATION:VALUE AND PRICINGA NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, 2018.Abstract

brasilia062118-solar.pdf

ANEEL SEMINAR ON DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES

Brasilia, DF, Brazil
June 21, 2018

Ashley C. Brown
Executive Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group
Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard University

Brown, Ashley. “Resource Selection: Coherent Policy Objectives, Flights of Fancy, or just serving special interests.” RESOURCE SELECTION: COHERENT POLICY OBJECTIVES, FLIGHTS OF FANTASY, OR JUST SERVING SPECIAL INTERESTS?, 2018.Abstract

boise060418.pdf

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
Western Conference
Boise, Idaho
June 4, 2018

Ashley C. Brown
Executive Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group
Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard University

Hogan, William. “Western Energy Imbalance Market: an Efficient Market with Conflicting Carbon Policies.” In, 2018.Abstract

hogan_eim_010818.pdf

Hogan, William. Western Energy Imbalance Market: an Efficient Market with Conflicting Carbon Policies (January 8, 2018)

Hogan, William W. “Western Energy Imbalance Market: An Efficient Market with Conflicting Carbon Policies.” EIM Body of State Regulators, 2018.

hogan_eim_010818.pdf

Ghesla, Claus, Manuel Grieder, and Renate Schubert. “Nudging the Poor and the Rich – A Field Study on the Distributional Effects of Green Electricity Defaults .” In, 2018.Abstract

nudging_poor_rich.pdf

Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from a field study in the residential electricity market in which we contrast consumers’ contract choices under an existing default regime with active choices without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped.