Publications

Foremost among a number of legislative reforms imposed upon state utility and regulatory commissions in recent years have been sunshine laws. The intent of sunshine laws is laudable and the idea simple: the public's business ought to be conducted in the open for the public to observe. Decision making should be transparent, with a clearly articulated rationale available for all who seek it. Not only the decision, but its evolution and the decision makers' thought processes, should be fully revealed. Few backroom deals can withstand such scrutiny. Should the level of accountability vary for an appointed or elected public official? In theory, no, but that only addresses questions about the appearance of accountability and openness. Does such a requirement improve the quality of decision
making; or, more importantly, does it improve the quality of decision? There is a strong case that it does not?

This article examines how the cost of transmission of power is to be incorporated in the utilities ratebase in a competitive bulk power market. The topics include a call for public discussion and debate, who should bear the risk of residual revenue responsibility for transmission assets, are actual costs and uses reflected in the allocation of responsibility for transmission revenues, and how can transmission pricing be used to reduce the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior by those entities owning both generation and transmission facilities.

Pierce, Richard. The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules. 43 Administrative Law Review 7. Winter 1991.

For years, utilities, regulators, and economists have discussed the possibility of opening access to the electric transmission grid. It is now well past the time to cut the Gordian knot in impasse over the debate, and to raise the key strategic question of whether utility owned transmission facilities belong in the ratebase paid for by native-load ratepayers. The question is complex, but requires public discussion and debate as we move inexorably to more competitive bulk power markets. The issue is best approached from three different perspectives: 

• Who should bear the risk of residual revenue respon-
sibility for transmission assets?

• Are actual costs and uses reflected in the allocation of responsibilities for transmission revenues?

• How can transmission pricing be used to reduce the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior by those entities owning both generation and trasmission.

Ostrom, Elinor. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring Common Property Resource Limitations" Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Table 3.1., p. 90. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1990."

Ostrom, Elinor. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring Common Property Resource Limitations" Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Table 3.1., p. 90. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1990.

There is a fundamental contradiction between the substantive task regulatory bodies, such as public utility commissions, are charged with performing and the process imposed upon them for doing it. This contradiction, often reinforced by the nature of judicial review, constitutes a severe hindrance to the effectiveness of regulation

Pierce, Richard. Unruly Judicial Review of Rulemaking." Natural Resources and Environment, Vol. 5, No. 2. Fall 1990."

Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch. 488 US 299, 316. 11 January 1989 (excerpt).

Pierce, Richard. Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institution? Georgetown Law Journal. 1989.

This article examines the nature and extent of authority which state utility commissions have to regulate access
to electric power transmission lines and pricing for such access. Somewhat surprisingly, since there has
been a common assumption that this is the domain of federal regulators, the author is able to point out
numerous bases for the exercise of jurisdiction by state regulators, by direct grants of authority, or indirectly
in the discharge of other responsibilities and duties.

Kaplow, Louis. An Economic Analysis Of Legal Transitions. 99 Harvard Law Review. pp. 511-617. 3 January 1986.

Jones, Douglas. Sunshine Laws and Public Utility Commissions: Partly Sunny Preferable? NRRI Quarterly Bulletin 15:1.

Joskow, Paul and Richard Schmalensee. Effectiveness of Competition. In Joskow and Schmalensee, Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation. Chapter 12. MIT Press. 1983.

US Congress. Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 1933.

US Congress. Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 1933.