Publications

Costly and economically inefficient command-and-control greenhouse gas regulations are firmly entrenched in law, and there is no plausible scenario in which they can be removed by conservative political force. Even were that not the case, the risks imposed by climate change are real, and a policy of ignoring those risks and hoping for the best is inconsistent with risk management practices conservatives embrace in other, non-climate contexts. Conservatives should embrace a carbon tax (a much less costly means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions) in return for elimination of EPA regulatory authority over greenhouse gas emissions, abolition of green energy subsidies and regulatory mandates, and offsetting tax cuts to provide for revenue neutrality. Arguments that unilateral action by the United States produces little climate benefit, that a carbon tax will expand the size of government, that a carbon tax is a regressive, that adaptation and geo-engineering is preferable to emissions constraint, that economists cannot confidently design a carbon tax that does more good than harm, that the legislative process cannot deliver a carbon tax worth embracing, and that promoting a carbon tax puts conservatives on a slippery political slope are explored and found wanting.

Wara, Michael. The EPA Clean Power Plan: What Now?" Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 80th Plenary Session, Houston, TX, October 2015."

On the occasion of President Xi’s State Visit to Washington, D.C., the United States and China today marked another major milestone in their joint leadership in the fight against climate change with the release of a U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change. The Statement, which builds on last November’s historic announcement by President Obama and President Xi of ambitious, respective post-2020 climate targets, describes a common vision for a new global climate agreement to be concluded in Paris this December. The Statement also includes significant domestic policy announcements and commitments to global climate finance, demonstrating the determination of both countries to act decisively to achieve the goals set last year.

Rossi, Jim. The Federal Power Act's Federalism(s)." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 79th Plenary Session, Washington, DC, June 2015."

Tierney, Susan, Paul Hibbard, and Craig Aubuchon. Electric System Reliability and EPA's Clean Power Plan: Tools and Practices." Analysis Group. Boston, MA, February 2015."

Terry, Cheryl. Hidden Value, Missing Money, and Electricity Markets." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 79th Plenary Session, Washington, DC, June 2015."

Excerpt from the introduction:

To the extent that any industry is central to the prosperity of economies and to social welfare, it is the energy industry, and particularly the electricity industry. The availability of electric supply is essential for both economic development and quality of life. It is also a critical requirement for human development. By its very nature, the energy services industry in general and the electricity industry in particular is capital intensive, technologically sophisticated, and, in developing countries as well as in many developed ones, highly dependent on foreign trade, services, and investment. That dependence derives from, among other things, lack of sufficient domestic capital, lack of trained personnel, and the fact that manufacturing of needed technology and fuel is often located outside the national boundaries of most developing countries. As a result, the development of the electricity industry, whose purpose is focused on domestic needs, is inextricably linked to the global flow of capital, equipment, fuels, and services. The result is that the regulatory regime designed to meet the requirements of the domestic market is inevitably compelled to interface with international trade and the rules surrounding it. The energy services industry, like all network-dependent businesses (e.g., natural gas, water, and railroads), has elements that are monopolistic in nature and other aspects that are suitable for competition. Monopolistic aspects of the industry, which may vary from one jurisdiction to another, cannot simply be left to the market. Doing so would permit abuses of monopoly power, including extracting very high rents, tolerating unacceptably low levels of service quality and productivity, and precluding the evolution of viably competitive markets. Thus, the centrality of electricity to the economy, combined with the unavoidable monopoly aspects of the industry , invites some measure of State regulation. The question governments face is not whether to regulate, but how and how much to regulate.

Perez-Arriaga, Ignacio, Carlos Batlle, and Christopher Knittel. Engineering, Economics and Regulation of the Electric Power Sector." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, Spring 2015."

Rossi, Jim. The Federal Power Act's Federalism(s)." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 79th Plenary Session, Washington, DC, June 2015."

Brown, Ashley. Public Policy and Modernization of Energy Systems Regulatory Options." Presentation to the Smart Grid Forum, Sao Paulo, Brazil, November 2015."

Shanker, Roy. Stakeholder Processes: A Good Idea, But..." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group 78th Plenary Session, Half Moon Bay, CA, March 2015."

Brown, Ashley. Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility in Regulation." Presentation to the 6th World Forum on Energy Regulation, Istanbul, Turkey, May 2015."

Supreme Court of the United States. On Writs of Certiorari: Brief of Robert L. Borlick, Joseph Bowring, James Bushness, and 19 Other Leading Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents. Nos. 14-840, 14-841. Washington, DC, 2015.

Bie, Ave. NYISO Governance." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group 78th Plenary Session, Half Moon Bay, CA, March 2015."

and Future Challenges"

State of the Market Report for PJM: Detailed Analysis." Monitoring Analytics. March 2015."

State of the Market Report for PJM: Introduction." Monitoring Analytics. March 2015."

EXCERPT FROM THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

 

This paper is part of an effort to evaluate matters affecting price formation in the energy and ancillary services markets operated by Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs) subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission). It focuses on operator-initiated commitments in the RTOs and ISOs and the challenges in internalizing all relevant physical and operational constraints in the day-ahead and real-time market processes. This paper defines an operator-initiated commitment as a commitment that is not associated with a resource clearing the day-ahead or real-time market on the basis of economics and that is not a self-schedule. Deeming an action to be “operator-initiated” is not intended to confer any judgment that the action is not appropriate or necessary to maintain reliability.

 

Chang, Judy. "EPA's Clean Power Plan." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group 76th Plenary Session, Cambridge, MA, October 2014.