Publications by Year: 2016

2016
Curran, Jennifer. “Beyond Order 1000: Seams Operations and Congestion Management.” In, 2016.Abstract

Curran, Jennifer. "Beyond Order 1000: Seams Operations and Congestion Management." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 83rd Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA, June 2, 2016. 

p1._curran.pdf
of the States, Supreme Court United. “FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION ET AL.” 2016.Abstract 14-840_oct_2015.pdf
Cicala, Steve. “Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity.” In, 2016.Abstract

This paper estimates changes in electricity generation costs caused by the introduction of market mechanisms to determine output decisions in service areas that were previously using command-and-control-type operations. I use the staggered transition to markets from 1999- 2012 to evaluate the causal impact of liberalization using a nationwide panel of hourly data on electricity demand and unit-level costs, capacities, and output. To address the potentially confounding effects of unrelated fuel price changes, I use machine learning methods to predict the allocation of output to generating units in the absence of markets for counterfactual pro- duction patterns. I find that markets reduce production costs by $3B per year by reallocating output among existing power plants: Gains from trade across service areas increase by 20% based on a 10% increase in traded electricity, and costs from using uneconomical units fall 20% from a 10% reduction in their operation.

2017-1_cicala_elec_gov_v_mkt_draft_2.pdf
Adly, Joseph. “Long-term Carbon Policy: The Great Swap.” In, 2016.Abstract

Excerpt trom the Introduction:
In the past two decades, the mounting risks posed by climate change have motivated businesses, cities, states, national governments, and the international community to pledge to take action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Given the scale of the problem, the breadth of action must be effective and must set the foundation for increasing mitigation efforts over time. Thus, delivering on these pledges will require effective policies to drive the deployment of low-carbon technologies today and technological innovation in the future to ramp ambition up on par with the risks of climate change.

Climate change is a problem no country can solve by itself. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has advocated for developed and developing countries to work together in combating climate change and, with the United States' leadership, the 2015 Paris Agreement delivered unprecedented commitments by virtually every country on the planet to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Now, the election of Donald J. Trump, an avowed global warming skeptic, has thrown America's commitment to global leadership in doubt. If the United States quits the fight against climate change, this risks unraveling the global coalition and could result in other countries following suit. This would be a tragic mistake with incalculable consequences for the entire planet. Moreover, some nations may retaliate against the United States by imposing tariffs on American-manufactured goods based on the greenhouse gas emissions associated with their production.

2016aldy-the-great-swap.pdf
Hogan, William W., Michael Caramanis, Elli Ntakou, and Aranya Chakrabortty. “Co-Optimization of Power and Reserves in Dynamic T&D Power Markets With Nondispatchable Renewable Generation and Distributed Energy Resources .” In, 2016. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Marginal-cost-based dynamic pricing of electric· ity services, including real power, reactive power, and reserves, may provide unprecedented efficiencies and system synergies that are pivotal to the sustainability of massive re· newable generation integrat ion. Extension of wholesale high-voltage power markets to allow distribution network connected prosumers to participate, albeit desirable, has stalled on high transaction costs and the lack of a tractable market clearing framework. This paper presents a distributed, massively parallel architecture that enables tractable transmission and distribution locational marginal price (T&DLMP) discovery along with optimal scheduling of centralized generation, decentralized conventional and flexible loads, and distributed energy resources (DERs). DERs include distributed generation; electric vehicle (EV) battery charging and storage; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) and c:ombined heat & power (CHP) microgenerators; computing; volt/var control devices; grid-friendly applianc:es; smart transformers; and more. The proposed iterative distributed architecture can discover T&DLMPs while capturing the full c:omplexity of each participating DER's intertemporal preferences and physical system dynamics.
Brown, Ashley. “Deploying Energy Storage in Africa: Market Structure, Policy and Pricing.” In, 2016. brown._power_and_electricity_world_africa.pdf
Brown, Ashley. “Electricity Markets: Interface between Regulation and Trade.” In, 2016. brown.unctad_5.25.16.pdf
Barmack, Matt. “A California Perspective on Cycling.” In, 2016. barmack_presentation.pdf
Casey, Keith. “Interregional Operational Opportunities in the West.” In, 2016. p1._casey.pdf
Lucas, Todd. “Interregional Transmission Service and Operations.” In, 2016. p1._lucas.pdf
Nelson, Jeffrey. “The Stakeholder Experience: The California ISO.” In, 2016. nelson_presentation.pdf
Brown, Ashley. “Challenging the Traditional Utility Business Model.” In, 2016.Abstract
Brown, Ashley. Challenging the Traditional Utility Business Model." Presentation to the 2016 Energy Symposium & User Groups. Atlantic Beach, FL, March 3, 2016."
brown_2016_energy_symposium_user_groups_atlantic_beach_fl.pdf
Vogelsang, Ingo. “The Convergence of Simple Regulatory Incentive Mechanisms for Electricity Transmission Pricing / Investment.""” In, 2016.Abstract
Vogelsang, Ingo. The Convergence of Simple Regulatory Incentive Mechanisms for Electricity Transmission Pricing / Investment." Presentation to the CIDE Electricity Policy Group. Mexico City, April 14, 2016."
vogelsand._cepg._mexico.pdf
Lucas, Todd. “Interregional Transmission Service and Operations.” In, 2016.Abstract
Lucas, Todd. Interregional Transmission Service and Operations." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 83rd Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA, June 2, 2016."
p1._lucas.pdf
Bresler, Stu. “Interregional Transmission Services and Operations: Beyond Order 1000.""” 2016.Abstract
Bresler, Stu. Interregional Transmission Services and Operations: Beyond Order 1000." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 83rd Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA, June 2, 2016."
p1._bresler.pdf
Wilson, Elizabeth. “Stakeholder Processes.” In, 2016.Abstract
Wilson, Elizabeth. Stakeholder Processes." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group's 82nd Plenary Session. Washington, DC, March 10, 2016."
wilson_presentation.pdf
Pool, Southwest Power. “The Value of Transmission.” In, 2016. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Southwest Power Pool. The Value of Transmission." January 2016."
Pfeifenberger, Johannes, and Judy Chang. “Well-Planned Electric Transmission Saves Customer Costs: Improved Transmission Planning Is Key to the Transition to a Carbon Constrained Future.” In, 2016.Abstract
Excerpt for the Executive Summary
The electric power industry is transforming rapidly due to low natural gas prices, technological changes, dramatic cost reductions in renewable generation, and increasingly ambitious environmental policy goals and consumer preferences. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Clean Power Plan (CPP) is perhaps the most visible and heavily-debated regulatory mandate in this trend toward an environmentally-constrained electricity industry. Much of the industry’s discussion about CPP and related environmental objectives has focused on energy efficiency, reducing coal-fired generation, and adding more renewable generation. This whitepaper complements those discussions by showing how a well-planned transmission system can help meet environmental objectives at lower overall costs, saving customers tens of billions of dollars compared to a system that is primarily planned to focus on more immediate needs to meet reliability requirements. The current uncertainties over CPP implementation are not likely to change the ongoing trend toward a clean power future, given that both market forces and policy preferences for cleaner energy sources are pushing in the same direction: natural gas prices currently are projected to remain relatively low for the foreseeable future, the costs of various renewable energy technologies continue to decrease, and customer preferences are evolving toward having more control over the their energy usage, including the energy source. Furthermore, many states, towns, corporations, and consumers are pursuing their goal of reducing emissions from electricity generation, independently of federal and state regulations. Such trends will invariably shift the country’s generation mix from coal to natural gas and renewable resources, with necessary upgrades to the nation’s transmission grid.
wires_brattle_report_transmissionplanning_june2016.pdf
Hogan, William W.Electricity Market Design: Financial Transmission Rights.” 2016.Abstract
Hogan, William. Electricity Market Design: Financial Transmission Rights." Presentation to the CIDE Electricity Policy Group. Mexico, April 14, 2016.
hogan_cepg_mexiso_041416_002.pdf
PJM,Resource Investment in Competitive Markets.” In, 2016.Abstract

Excerpt from the Executive Summary:

Organized wholesale electricity markets were created to address burgeoning costs of new power generation under the traditional regulatory scheme and to encourage innovation through free-enterprise competition. The discipline of the marketplace promised lower costs and greater efficiencies. Two decades of experience and numerous studies have demonstrated competitive wholesale markets in PJM and elsewhere bring increased operational efficiency and innovation, resulting from transparent market prices and the benefits of single, independent dispatch across a broad region. These benefits are realized through economies of scale that permit optimization of a large and diverse set of resources and load. The resulting efficiencies are measured in reduced heat rates and increased capacity factors.

However, as a host of organic and external factors change the power supply landscape, some have questioned the efficacy of competitive wholesale markets at promoting the most efficient entry and exit of resources – especially compared to traditional utility regulation with administrative planning and direction, such as under a state-integrated resource plan. Various forces, including federal and state public policies, low-priced domestic natural gas and static or declining levels of wholesale electricity consumption, have challenged incumbent or “legacy” generation resources by increasing operating costs, creating capital investment needs and reducing revenues realized in PJM’s energy, capacity and ancillary service markets. For the least efficient of these resources – older, small coal units, single-unit nuclear stations and older, high-heat-rate natural gas and oil-fired generation – these cost and revenue pressures have threatened their ongoing viability and not unexpectedly have led to retirements in many cases.

Consequently, some observers have questioned whether wholesale markets have forced premature retirements of viable legacy generating resources and whether markets can be relied upon to ensure adequate power supplies in light of the retirements. The questions raised with regard to decisions and outcomes related to the changing nature of the supply portfolio in PJM can be summarized as:

Can we rely on PJM’s organized wholesale electricity market to efficiently and reliably manage the entry and exit of supply resources as external forces create tremendous uncertainty and potential industry transformation?

The goal of this paper is to answer this question. In doing so, this paper does not present itself as an exhaustive or scientific analysis of what are complex issues characterized by numerous variables. In some cases, the value proposition brought to the generation investment decision by competitive markets can be shown with a high degree of confidence. In other cases, the relative advantage of a competitive versus a regulated paradigm in efficiently bringing in new generation and exiting inefficient generation is more arguable. Finally, certain challenges and difficult outcomes necessarily result from the operation of PJM markets in driving investment decisions – challenges and difficulties involving choices between often-competing social and political interests. In contrast, when investment decisions are driven by utilities and their regulators, a trade-off between diverging policy interests can be made directly and explicitly, though not necessarily from a well-informed understanding of the trade-off.

pjm_resource_investment_0516.pdf

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