Publications

Henderson, Steve. RTO Cost Benefit Analysis. 22 May 2003. Presentation, 11 pages.

Mayhew, James. The Virtues of a Virtual RTO. 26 September 2003. Presentation, 19 pages.

Scott, Harvey. The Virtues of Virtual RTOs. 26 September 2003. Presentation, 16 pages.

Boston, Terry. The Virtues of Virtual RTOs. 26 September 2003. Presentation, 29 pages.

Klein, Abram. Affidavit of Abram W. Klein: Evidence of ISO-NE Market Performance in Support of Rejecting ISO-NE's First Level Mitigation Thresholds. 28 October 2002. Paper, regulatory affidavit, 15 pages.

Ruff, Larry. Economic Principles of Demand Response in Electricity. Prepared by Larry Ruff for the Edison Electric Institute. The opinions and conclusions of the paper are those of the author alone. October 2002. Paper, 58 pages.

General Accounting Office of US Congress (GAO). Lessons Learned from Electricity Restructuring: Transition to Competitive Markets Underway but Full Benefits Will Take Time and Effort to Achieve. December 2002. Paper, 74 pages.

Klein, Abram. Scarcity Pricing in Northeast ISOs: An Assessment of Market Performance. 14 November 2002. Presentation, 29 pages.

O'Neill, Richard, Paul Sotkiewicz, Benjamin Hobbs, Michael Rothkopf and William Stewart, Jr. Efficient Market-Clearing Prices in Markets with Nonconvexities. 9 December 2002. Paper, 34 pages.

Bradford, Peter (Regulatory Assistance Project). Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation, Infrastructure and Nuclear Safety - Renewal of the Price Anderson Act. 23 Januaryr 2002. Testimony, analysis, 4 pages.

Electric Power Supply Association. 2000 Data Update: Assessing the Good Ol' Days" of Cost-Plus Regulation. 3 April 2002. Paper, 17 pages. Appendix: Utility by Utility Data on Inflation Adjusted Prices/KwH 3 April 2002. Appendix Report, 336 pages."

Rose, Kenneth and Venkata Bujimalla. 2002 Review of Electric Power Markets 30 August 2002. Paper, 116 pages.

Rose, Kenneth and Venkata Bujimalla. 2002 Review of Electric Power Markets 30 August 2002. Paper, 116 pages.

Cooper, Mark (Consumer Federation of America). All Pain, No Gain: Restructuring and Deregulation in the Interstate Electricity Market. September 2002. Summary, 43 pages.

Fabra, Natalia, Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr and David Harbord. Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey. 9 November 2002. Paper, 37 pages.

Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market and the recent debate in California, we charac- terize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey electricity auctions. The aim is to gain an improved under- standing of how different auction formats affect the degree of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity markets. We find that the uniform auction is (weakly) outperformed in consumer surplus terms by the discriminatory auction, but that uniform auctions are (weakly) more efficient. Vickrey auctions guarantee productive efficiency, but at the expense of large payments to firms. The overall welfare ranking of the auctions is thus ambiguous. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids. We also provide a characterization of multi-unit Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.

 

 

Fabra, Natalia, Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr and David Harbord. Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey. 9 November 2002. Paper, 37 pages.

Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market and the recent debate in California, we charac- terize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey electricity auctions. The aim is to gain an improved under- standing of how different auction formats affect the degree of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity markets. We find that the uniform auction is (weakly) outperformed in consumer surplus terms by the discriminatory auction, but that uniform auctions are (weakly) more efficient. Vickrey auctions guarantee productive efficiency, but at the expense of large payments to firms. The overall welfare ranking of the auctions is thus ambiguous. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids. We also provide a characterization of multi-unit Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.

 

 

Fabra, Natalia, Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr and David Harbord. Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey. 9 November 2002. Paper, 37 pages.

Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market and the recent debate in California, we charac- terize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey electricity auctions. The aim is to gain an improved under- standing of how different auction formats affect the degree of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity markets. We find that the uniform auction is (weakly) outperformed in consumer surplus terms by the discriminatory auction, but that uniform auctions are (weakly) more efficient. Vickrey auctions guarantee productive efficiency, but at the expense of large payments to firms. The overall welfare ranking of the auctions is thus ambiguous. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids. We also provide a characterization of multi-unit Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.

 

 

Institut d'Economie Industrielle (France). Papers from Wholesale Markets for Electricity" Conference. 22-23 November 2002. Website.

Alexander, Barbara (NCAT). The Transition to Retail Competition in Energy Markets: How Have Residential Consumers Fared? Part One: An Analysis of Residential Energy Markets in Georgia, Massachusetts, Ohio, New York and Texas. September 2002. Paper, 43 pages.

Brown, Matthew (NCAT). The Transition to Retail Competition in Energy Markets: How Have Residential Consumers Fared? Part Two: An Analysis of Opt-out Aggregation in Massachusetts and Ohio. September 2002. Paper, 10 pages.