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2018
Hogan, William W. “Western Energy Imbalance Market: An Efficient Market with Conflicting Carbon Policies.” EIM Body of State Regulators, 2018. hogan_eim_010818.pdf
Ghesla, Claus, Manuel Grieder, and Renate Schubert. “Nudging the Poor and the Rich – A Field Study on the Distributional Effects of Green Electricity Defaults .” In, 2018.Abstract
Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from a field study in the residential electricity market in which we contrast consumers’ contract choices under an existing default regime with active choices without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped.
nudging_poor_rich.pdf
Ghesla, Claus, Manuel Grieder, and Renate Schubert. “Nudging the Poor and the Rich – A Field Study on the Distributional Effects of Green Electricity Defaults .” In, 2018.Abstract
Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from a field study in the residential electricity market in which we contrast consumers’ contract choices under an existing default regime with active choices without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped.
nudging_poor_rich.pdf
Ghesla, Claus, Manuel Grieder, and Renate Schubert. “Nudging the Poor and the Rich – A Field Study on the Distributional Effects of Green Electricity Defaults .” In, 2018.Abstract
Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from a field study in the residential electricity market in which we contrast consumers’ contract choices under an existing default regime with active choices without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped.
nudging_poor_rich.pdf
The Dark Side of Solar: How the rising solar industry empowers political interests that could impede a clean energy transition
Sivaram, Varun. “The Dark Side of Solar: How the rising solar industry empowers political interests that could impede a clean energy transition,” 2018.Abstract
Sivaram, Varun. The Dark Side of Solar: How the rising solar industry empowers political interests that could impede a clean energy transition; Brookings, April 2018.
fp_20180416_dark_side_solar.pdf
2017
Commission, New York Public Service. “New York Public Service Commission Order on Net Energy Metering Transition, Phase One of Value of Distributed Energy Resources, and Related Matters.” In, 2017. nypsc_der_030917.pdf
Hogan, William W. “Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT.” In, 2017. hogan_pope_ercot_050917.pdf
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Rossetto, Nicol, and Jorge Vasconcelos. “Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks.” In, 2017.Abstract
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Rossetto, Nicol and Vasconcelos, Jorge. Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks. European University Institute, April 2017.
tso_final.pdf
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Rossetto, Nicol, and Jorge Vasconcelos. “Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks.” In, 2017.Abstract
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Rossetto, Nicol and Vasconcelos, Jorge. Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks. European University Institute, April 2017.
tso_final.pdf
Cicala, Steve. “Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation.” In, 2017.Abstract
Cicala, Steve, Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation." January 22, 2017
2017-1_cicala_elec_gov_v_mkt_draft_2.pdf
Cicala, Steve. “Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation.” In, 2017.Abstract
Cicala, Steve, Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation." January 22, 2017"
2017-1_cicala_elec_gov_v_mkt_draft_2.pdf
Hogan, William W., and Susan L. Pope. “Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT.” In, 2017.Abstract
Hogan, William W. and Pope, Susan L. Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT. May 2017.
hogan_pope_ercot_050917.pdf
Hogan, William W., and Susan L. Pope. “Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT.” In, 2017.Abstract
Hogan, William W. and Pope, Susan L. Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT. May 2017.
hogan_pope_ercot_050917.pdf
Klein, Abram. “Competitive Electricity Markets: Weening Markets from Rent-Seeking Subsidies and Capacity Markets.” In Nodal Trader Conference,. New York, NY, October 26, 2017, 2017. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Klein, Abram W. "Competitive Electricity Markets: Weening Markets from Rent-Seeking Subsidies and Capacity Markets," presented at Nodal Trader Conference, New York, NY, October 26, 2017
klein_nodal_trader_competitive_marketssubsidies.pdf
and Vietor, Richard H.K. “Mexico's Energy Reform.” In, 2017.Abstract
Vietor, Richard H.K. and Sheldahl-Thomason, Haviland, Mexico's Energy Reform." January 23, 2017. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing."
mexican_energy_reform_draft_1.23.pdf
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Ro. “Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks.” In, 2017.Abstract
Glachant, Jean-Michel; Rossetto, NicolÌ_ and Vasconcelos, Jorge. Moving the Electricity Transmission System Towards a Decarbonised and Integrated Europe: Missing Pillars and Roadblocks. European University Institute, April 2017.
tso_final.pdf
2003 Blackout, “2003 Blackout.” In, 2017. Publisher's VersionAbstract
2003 Blackout
Shavel, Ira. “Diversity of Reliability Attributes: A Key Component of the Modern Grid.” In, 2017.Abstract
Shavel, Ira; Kline, Michael; Lueken, Roger; Ruiz, Pablo. Diversity of Reliability Attributes: A Key Component of the Modern Grid. Prepared for American Petroleum Institute by The Brattle Group, May 2017.
brattle_20170517-api-diversity-of-attributes_1.pdf
Hibbard, Paul. “Electricity Markets, Reliability and the Evolving U.S. Power System.” In, 2017.Abstract
Hibbard, Paul; Tierney, Susan; Franklin, Katherine. Electricity Markets, Reliability and the Evolving U.S. Power System. Analysis Group, June 2017
ag_markets_reliability_final_june_2017.pdf
Hogan, William W. Priorities for the Evolution of an Energy-Only Electricity Market Design in ERCOT, 2017.Abstract

Electricity markets employ open access and non‐discrimination to foster competition, market entry, and innovation. The physical characteristics of the electricity system require explicit consideration of key elements in electricity market design. Pricing and settlement rules for the real‐time market must provide efficient incentives, both for short‐term operations and long‐run investment. The ERCOT energy‐only market design emphasizes the need to get the real‐time prices right. The recent innovation of the ERCOT Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC) addressed the fundamental problem of inadequate region‐wide scarcity pricing that has plagued other organized markets, which have exhibited inadequate incentives both for reliable operations and efficient investment.

ERCOT employs an open wholesale electricity market as the basis for short‐term reliable electricity supply as well as for long‐term investments to maintain reliability in the future. A review of energy price formation in ERCOT leads to two important conclusions: (i) while the ORDC is performing consistently within its design, scarcity price formation is being adversely influenced by factors not contemplated by the ORDC; (ii) other aspects of the ERCOT market design must be improved to better maintain private market response to energy prices as the driver of resource investment, maintenance expenditure and retirement decisions.

The paper identifies three general issues that have affected ERCOT energy prices in recent years, and recommends policy and price formation improvements consistent with efficient market design. These recommendations cannot reverse the impact of broader economic trends, such as low natural gas prices, or national policies, such as subsidies for investments in renewable resources. However, the stress of these forces has exposed areas where there is a need for adjustments to pricing rules and policies within ERCOT.

System‐wide Price Formation

• Marginal Losses:The efficiency of region‐wide prices in ERCOT is distorted by the omission of the marginal cost of transmission losses from ERCOT’s energy market dispatch and pricing.

• ORDC Enhancements: The system‐wide ORDC calculation should be enhanced to address the reliability impacts of changes in the generation supply mix and the price impacts of reliability.

 Locational Scarcity Pricing

• Out‐of‐Market Actions to Manage Transmission Constraints: Local scarcity pricing and mitigation rules require changes to properly set prices when there are reliability unit commitments or other ERCOT reliability actions to manage transmission constraints; these changes should not disable rules for local market power mitigation.

• Dispatch and Pricing for Local Reserve Scarcity: Introduction of local reserve requirements, implemented through co‐optimization of the energy dispatch and reserve schedules, would provide a market solution to properly set prices when there are constraints on reserve availability in a sub‐region.

Transmission Planning and Cost Recovery

• Transmission Planning: Market‐reflective policies for transmission investment should be considered as a replacement for Texas’ socialized transmission planning, which, by building new transmission in advance of scarcity developing, fails to provide the opportunity for markets to respond.

• Transmission Cost Recovery: Alternatives for transmission cost recovery to replace or reduce dependence on the summer peak demand‐based mechanism for the allocation of sunk transmission costs would reduce distortion of energy market pricing.

An Appendix provides further details on a formulation and computational approach for calculation of co‐optimized prices for energy and operating reserves with local reserve requirements.

hogan_pope_ercot_050917.pdf

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