

**HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP**  
**NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY SESSION**

Ritz Carlton Half Moon Bay  
Half Moon Bay, California  
THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, MARCH 26-27, 2019

**DRAFT AGENDA**

**Tuesday, March 26, 2019**

8:30 am      **Breakfast and Informal Discussion**

9:00 am      **Session One.**  
**Competition in Transmission: Policy Direction and Experience Since Order 1000**

In Order 1000, the FERC opened the door to building high voltage transmission on a competitive basis and turning away from the traditional right of first refusal. What, if any, changes have occurred in the transmission market as a consequence of this decision? What has been the effect on the costs and pricing of transmission? What impact, if any, has there been in regard to congestion and locational prices? Have we seen innovations in technology and/or rate design as a result? What impact, if any, has there been on enabling greater access to non-transmission assets to enter the market to compete for providing services that have historically been provided by transmission facilities? How, if at all, has reliability and/or dispatch operations, been affected? Is there a need to develop a hybrid model of expansion where some circumstances require a first refusal approach while others lend themselves better to open competition? Based on experience, what are the best policy options going further?

**Judy Chang**, The Brattle Group  
**Jennifer Curran**, Midcontinent ISO  
**Nina Plaushin**, ITC  
**Sharon Segner**, LS Power

**Tuesday, March 26 (cont'd)**

10:30 am      **Coffee Break**

10:45 am      **Discussion**

12:00 pm      **Lunch**

1:00 pm      **Session Two.**  
**Gas and Electric Coordination: Evolution or Revolution?**

The resilience discussion raises reliability questions about vulnerabilities in power supplies due to interruptions or shortages in natural gas. Economic efficiency dictates that short-term trading of gas supply and pipeline capacity to help meet power demands might benefit from more than the invisible hand. Market power in one market has been argued as affecting returns in the other. The benefits of organized electricity markets in improving market operations have been recognized. Would similar reforms in natural gas been helpful? Do reconsiderations of resilience need imply greater coordination between the markets? How might economic efficiency be improved through an explicit coordination of dispatch? Given the different physical scheduling and trading practices in natural gas and power, how difficult would it be to formalize coordination? How would reforms affect current trading practices? Is the invisible hand already working well enough? Are market operations and market monitoring reforms needed? Or should the oversight regulators leave well enough alone?

Moderator: **Mark Rothleider**, California ISO

**Robert Ethier**, ISO New England  
**Jonathan Peress**, Environmental Defense Fund  
**Alex Rudkevich**, Newton Energy Group  
**Yuan Zhou**, Castleton Commodities International

2:30 pm      **Coffee Break**

2:45 pm      **Discussion**

4:00 pm      **Adjourn**

6:30 pm      **Reception and Dinner**

**Wednesday, March 27**

8:30 am      **Breakfast and Informal Discussion**

9:00 am      **Session Three.**  
**Utility Liability: The Pros and Cons of Socializing Risks**

The liability of utilities for damages or injuries caused by them or their agents in the course of meeting their service obligations has been an issue in writing both laws and tariffs for some time. Recent issues involving electric utilities and gas companies in both California and Massachusetts have raised the profile of what had heretofore largely been below the public radar. Setting aside the specifics of the California and Massachusetts cases, what are the larger issues at play? What is the right balance between socializing and privatizing liability? How much of a moral hazard, if any, do we create, if we move away from imposing liability on the party responsible for a loss? In making these decisions is it necessary to distinguish between different types of liabilities, such as ordinary negligence, recklessness, product defects, and/or deficiencies in the delivery of adequate levels of service? How do we factor in the physical risk environment? Should there be geographically differentiated rates for customers reflecting the physical environment in which they are located? How should policy makers and regulators balance between safety and reliability in terms of what is expected from regulated utilities? Does the scale of the liability impact the decision on who should bear the risk of loss?

**Ashley Brown**, Harvard Kennedy School  
**Margaret Peloso**, Vinson & Elkins  
**Jim Rossi**, Vanderbilt University Law School  
**Michael Wara**, Stanford University

10:30 am      **Coffee Break**

10:45 am      **Discussion**

12:00 pm      **Adjourn**