Find papers and presentations on all emerging technologies, or specifically on the topics of distributed energy resources, electric storage, PEVs, research and development, the smart grid, and technology incentives.
Smutny-Jones, Jan. Regulating Generation: When Do Wholesale and Retail Generation Become Part of the Same Whole? - How Very Zen." Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group 75th Plenary Session, Cambridge, MA, June 2014."
In this paper we propose a method for the allocation of fixed (capital and non-variable operation and maintenance) costs at the medium voltage (MV) distribution level. The method is derived from the philosophy behind the widely used MW- mile methodology for transmission networks that bases fixed cost allocations on the “extent of use” that is derived from load flows. We calculate the “extent of use” by multiplying the total consumption or generation at a busbar by the marginal current variations, or power to current distribution factors (PIDFs) that an increment of active and reactive power consumed, or generated in the case of distributed generation, at each busbar, produces in each circuit. These PIDFs are analogous to power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs).
Unlike traditional tariff designs that average fixed costs on a per kWh basis across all customers, the proposed method provides more cost reflective price signals and helps eliminate possible cross-subsidies that deter profitable (in the case of competition) or cost-effective (in the case of a fully regulated industry) deployment of DG by directly accounting for use and location in the allocation of fixed costs. An application of this method for a rural radial distribution network is presented.
Generators supplying electricity markets are subject to volatile input and output prices and uncertain fuel availability. Price-risk may be hedged to a considerable extent but fuel-risk — water flows in the case of hydro and gas availability in the case of thermal plants — may not be. We show that a price-taking generator will only generate when the output price exceeds its marginal cost by an amount that reflects the value of the option to delay the use of stored fuel. The corresponding offer price is different from the theorized offer prices of static uniform auctions and more akin to pay-as-bid auction prices. We argue that the option value of delaying fuel use, which is an increasing function of spot price volatility and the uncertainty about fuel availability, must be considered when evaluating whether market power is present in electricity markets. The engineering approach to simulating an electricity supply curve, which has been used in market power evaluations to date, may lead to supply curves that are quite different from those that recognize possible fuel availability limitations, even in the complete absence of market power.