Transmission Risk Hedging Products: Solutions for the Market and Consequences for the TSOs.” In, 2006.Abstract

    Executive Summary

    In the framework of the EC Regulation 1228/2003, the goal of this background paper is to provide a description of the different market based solutions available for transmission risk hedging in congestion management. This paper presents three different transmission risk hedging products that can be offered to the market in the field of cross-border trade and congestion management. Due to various facts several price zones exist within the overall European electricity market where the demand of each zone is met in real time by the production of the respective zone and a zone specific market price is found (e.g. on the respective Power Exchange). This raises the question of how a market player wishing to buy electricity in a certain price zone and to sell it in another one can hedge the risk of a price difference emerging between those zones. This paper describes the three main kinds of transmission risk hedging products identified by ETSO: • Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs); • Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs); • Financial Contracts for Differences (CfDs); The paper also provides a first evaluation of the different solutions adopting a markets’ perspective. From a practical perspective, the implementation of forward PTRs only requires a minimum of market infrastructure and contractual arrangements. This is probably the reason for this product to be widely and successfully implemented on most European interconnections. However, Market Splitting or Coupling or co-ordinated implicit auctions would be the main prerequisite towards the implementation of marketbased FTRs and CfDs in Europe. Vice versa, in case Implicit Auctions (Market Splitting or Coupling) are introduced FTRs form a reasonable complement to those schemes for transmission hedging.

    Joskow, Paul. “Patterns of Transmission Investment.” In, 2005. Publisher's VersionAbstract

    This paper examines a number of issues associated with alternative analytical approaches for evaluating investments in electricity transmission infrastructure and alternative institutional arrangements to govern network operation, maintenance and investment. The economic and physical attributes of different types of transmission investments are identified and discussed. Alternative organizational and regulatory structures and their attributes are presented. The relationships between transmission investments driven by opportunities to reduce congestion and loss costs and transmission investment driven by traditional engineering reliability criteria are discussed. Reliability rules play a much more important role in transmission investment decisions today than do economic investment criteria as depicted in standard economic models of transmission networks. These models fail to capture key aspects of transmission operating and investment behavior that are heavily influenced by uncertainty, contingency criteria and associated engineering reliability rules. I illustrate how the wholesale market and transmission investment frameworks have addressed these issues in England and Wales (E&W) since 1990 and in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the U.S. since 2000. I argue that economic and reliability-based criteria for transmission investment are fundamentally interdependent. Ignoring these interdependencies will have adverse effects on the efficiency of investment in transmission infrastructure and undermine the success of electricity market liberalization.