Publications

Market Liquidity Means, Ends & Myths
By Abram W. Klein
Prepared for Harvard Electricity Policy Group
9 March 2012 Santa Monica, CA

Koster, Evan. OTC Energy Derivatives and Financial Reform: A Solution to Financial Stability or a Solution in Search of a Problem? Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 15 pages.

Cusenza, Paul. Financial Reform: Intended and Unintended Consequences. Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 15 pages.

Wilde, Dean. Financial Reform - Intended and Unintended Consequences. Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 3 pages.

McBride Johnson, Philip. Financial Reform: A Rough View. Distributed to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 6 pages.

McBride Johnson, Philip. Turf Wars" - an Essay. Distributed to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 4 pages."

Coscia, Carl. Constellation Energy: Comments on Proposed OTC Reforms. Presentation to the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Fifty-Ninth Plenary Session. Cambridge, MA. May 20, 2010. 10 pages.

Hartridge, Olivia. Carbon Markets: Why and How? Presentation to the HEPG Fifty-First Plenary Session, 1 June 2007.  19 pages.

Wilde, Dean. Electricity Markets Outlook. 30 November 2006. Presentation, 12 pages.

Brown, Ashley. Corporate Governance in Energy: Post-Enron. 8 May 2003. Presentation, 13 pages.

For years, utilities, regulators, and economists have discussed the possibility of opening access to the electric transmission grid. It is now well past the time to cut the Gordian knot in impasse over the debate, and to raise the key strategic question of whether utility owned transmission facilities belong in the ratebase paid for by native-load ratepayers. The question is complex, but requires public discussion and debate as we move inexorably to more competitive bulk power markets. The issue is best approached from three different perspectives: 

• Who should bear the risk of residual revenue respon-
sibility for transmission assets?

• Are actual costs and uses reflected in the allocation of responsibilities for transmission revenues?

• How can transmission pricing be used to reduce the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior by those entities owning both generation and trasmission.