Publications

    Fabra, Natalia, Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr, and David Harbord. “Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey.” In, 2002.Abstract

    Fabra, Natalia, Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr and David Harbord. Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey. 9 November 2002. Paper, 37 pages.

    Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market and the recent debate in California, we charac- terize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey electricity auctions. The aim is to gain an improved under- standing of how different auction formats affect the degree of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity markets. We find that the uniform auction is (weakly) outperformed in consumer surplus terms by the discriminatory auction, but that uniform auctions are (weakly) more efficient. Vickrey auctions guarantee productive efficiency, but at the expense of large payments to firms. The overall welfare ranking of the auctions is thus ambiguous. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids. We also provide a characterization of multi-unit Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.

     

     

    Schubert, Eric, Sam Zhou, Tony Grasso, and Grace Niu. A Primer on Wholesale Market Design, 2002.Abstract

    This white paper is a primer on wholesale market design and provides background for the open meeting workshop scheduled by the Public Utility Commission of Texas for November 1, 2002. The paper is divided into six sections:

    1. Reasons for this rulemaking;

    2. Measures of an efficient, sustainable market;

    3. Architecture of power markets;

    4. Elements of a power market;

    5. Basic economics of congestion management and day-ahead markets;

    6. Descriptions of wholesale electric markets around the world.

    Brown, Ashley. “The Privatization of Brazilªs Electricity Industry: Sector Reform or Restatement of the Governmentªs Balance Sheet?” In, 2002.Abstract

    Excerpt from the Background section:

     

    The Brazilian Power Sector, Latin America's largest, unique among energy suppliers to the world's leading economies, is almost completely dependent on one resource for its energy supply: water. Of its 65, 134 MW of installed generating capacity, in 1998 more than 90% was hydro. A substantial amount of that hydro capacity is located on only a few rivers. The sites for the generating facilities, by virtue of the nature of the resource, are generally far removed from major load centers, leaving the country highly dependent on long transmission lines to move electricity from the producer to the consumers. This dependence greatly complicated Brazil’s coordination and optimization in the use off its resources. Seasonal and regional differences in precipitation and water levels, coupled with the fact that most dams are multi-purpose facilities, providing irrigation and navigation as well as energy production, gave rise to a very sophisticated national model for coordination and dispatch. The model worked quite well in operating the generation and transmission sectors in a reasonably efficient manner.

    Historically, the ownership of the power sector has changed from private to state and then back to private ownership. Indeed, the nationalization of the industry was only completed in the late 1970's, and even then it was not 100% nationalized. State ownership, however, did not necessarily mean ownership by the national government. Although the Brazilian Constitution vests responsibility for the electricity sector with the national government, in fact, much of the distribution sector was owned by state governments. In some states, including major ones such as Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Parana, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro, the state government-owned utilities were at least partially vertically integrated. By the early to mid 1990’s when restructuring came on the agenda, the industry structure was clear. With the exceptions of nationally owned distribution companies in Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, Brasilia and a few scattered, privately owned companies, the distribution companies were, as noted, owned by state governments. The part of the industry owned by the national government was generally housed under the umbrella of the government holding company, Eletrobras. These entities included four large generating and transmission companies: Chesf, FURNAS, Eletronorte, and Eletrosul (later Gerasul); the industry research arm, CEPEL; and the energy efficiency program, Procel. The huge Itaipu hydro plant was operated by an independent governmental authority, created pursuant to a treaty with Paraguay, with whom the facility is shared. The entire electric sector was, nominally, at least, subject to the “regulatory” authority of the National Department of Water and Energy (DNAEE). DNAEE’s staff was almost entirely composed of employees of regulated entities on loan to the regulator for stated periods of time, and was anything but independent. While it had a role in approving tariffs and was often consulted on industry related matters, it lacked an independent governing board, any independent and final authority of its own, and functioned generally as only a small piece of the overall bureaucratic structure of the industry. Overseeing DNAEE and responsible for policy within the sector was the Ministry of Mines and Energy.

    Henney, Alex, and Tim Russ. “Lessons from The Institutional Framework of Transmission, System Operation, and Energy Markets in Most West European Countries and Some Other Countries Ò The Case for Transcos.” In, 2002.Abstract
    Henney, Alex and Tim Russell. Lessons from The Institutional Framework of Transmission, System Operation, and Energy Markets in Most West European Countries and Some Other Countries Ò The Case for Transcos. 1 July 2002. FERC Docket No. RM 01-12-00. 47 pages.
    Cripps, Jerrold, and Dougl ". “National Electricity Tribunal Reasons for Decision: In the Matter of an Application for Review of a NEMMCO Determination on the SNI Interconnector dated 6 December 2001 Appendices.” In, 2002.Abstract
    Cripps, Jerrold and Douglas Williamson (National Electricity Tribunal). Reasons for Decision: In the Matter of an Application for Review of a NEMMCO Determination on the SNI Interconnector dated 6 December 2001. Related Appendices. 24 October 2002. Judicial ruling, 73 pages.
    McDonell, Gavan (National ". “National Electricity Tribunal Reasons for Decision: In the Matter of an Application for Review of a NEMMCO Determination on the SNI Interconnector dated 6 December 2001 Appendices.” In, 2002.Abstract
    McDonell, Gavan (National Electricity Tribunal). Reasons for Decision: In the Matter of an Application for Review of a NEMMCO Determination on the SNI Interconnector dated 6 December 2001. Related Appendices. 24 October 2002. Judicial ruling, 11 pages.