Publications

    Brown, Ashley. “The Duty of Regulators to Have Ex Parte Communications.” The Electricity Journal 29, no. 9 (2016): 27-30. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    By confining regulators to judicial constraints when they are acting in a legislative capacity, the Herculean task of directing the path of electricity restructuring is being undertaken under rules that require decision-makers to be utterly passive and only minimally inquisitive. Regulators should be free, when acting in their quasi-legislative capacities, to act like legislators and not like judges.
    Linares, Pedro, Francisco Javier Santos, Mariano Ventosa, and Luis Lapiedra. “Incorporating oligopoly, CO2 emissions trading and green certificates into a power generation expansion model.” Automatica 44, no. 6 (2008): 1608-1620. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    This paper presents a generation expansion model for the power sector which incorporates several features that make it very interesting for application to current electricity markets: it considers the possible oligopolistic behavior of firms, and incorporates relevant policy instruments, carbon emissions trading and tradable green certificates. It combines powerful traditional tools related to the detailed system operation with techniques for modeling the economic market equilibrium and a formulation for the resolution of the emissions permit and tradable green certificates market equilibrium. The model is formulated as a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) which allows the optimization problem for each firm considering the power, carbon and green certificate markets to be solved simultaneously. The model has been implemented in GAMS. An application to the Spanish power system is also presented.
    Cooper, Mark. All Pain, No Gain: Restructuring and Deregulation in the Interstate Electricity Market. Consumer Federation of America, 2002.Abstract

    Excerpt from the Executive Summary:

     

    WHEN YOU ARE HEADED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION, GOING FASTER DOES NOT HELP

    Institutions Should Fit the Facts

    Electricity is a unique industry. It is a complex, real time network that requires cooperation and coordination to deliver a vital service. Demand for electricity is inelastic. Consumers faced with high electric prices cannot simply stop using electricity or switch to something else. Supply of electricity is also inelastic. Substantial new power plants take long lead times to construct. The transmission system cannot be expanded easily. Once produced, electricity cannot be stored very efficiently. As a result, it is deeply “affected with the public interest” and requires a balance of public and private responsibilities and incentives to keep it running smoothly. Restructuring and deregulation have undermined these values in the electricity industry. State policymakers recognized these problems and slowed down or reversed the irresponsible rush toward deregulation. Unfortunately, federal policymakers are charging ahead with deregulation policies such as the Electricity Title of the Energy Bill and the Standard Market Design proposal put forth by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

    All Pain, No Gain

    States have been convinced to slow down or stop restructuring based on a mountain of evidence that restructuring and deregulation of the electricity industry offers enormous risks for consumers and virtually no rewards. Restructuring and deregulation has unleashed abuse of market power, excessive scarcity overcharges, inefficient transactions costs, and a sharp increase in the cost of capital. These cost increases swamp efficiency gains projected for deregulation.

Pages